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ABSTRACT
A Doctor’s Conscience: Conventional and Reflective Morality in Clinical Decision
Making
by
John Elliot Delap, III
Dr. David Fott, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Political Science
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This work examines ethical theories of deontology, teleology, internal and
external morality as applied in conventional and reflective moral methods towards
equilibrium among eight normative values for healthcare including: autonomy,
beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice, privacy, confidentiality, veracity and fidelity. Upon
critical analysis of conventional and reflective moral praxis’s both are found to be
insufficient in accommodating value pluralism. This work concludes by outlining a
hybrid model for ethical decision making complementing both theories by bringing
together conventions and reflection to more effectively guide professional medical
practice toward the teleological aim o f medicine.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
In 2004 healthcare expenditures accounted for 16% of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) for the United States economy, amounting to $1.9 trillion. This figure
represents a near doubling o f healthcare GDP since 1980 when expenditures accounted
for 9% of GDP. Growth in healthcare expenditures outpaced total economic growth from
1980 to 2004. Fiver percent (5%) of the total population of the United States consumed
49% of the healthcare dollar treating five chronic conditions including diabetes, mood
disorders, heart disease, hypertension, and asthma. Most of those with these conditions
are Medicare and or Medicaid beneficiaries (Stanton 2006,1 -7).
These figures illustrate a number of important considerations. First, healthcare is
an important policy issue because of its high cost and broad effect. Public expenditures
on healthcare through Medicare and Medicaid accounted for 85% of total spending on
these five most chronic conditions (Stanton 2006, 7). Regardless of whether or not one
has health insurance or not, a substantial amount of public money is spent on healthcare.
This fact alone makes healthcare relevant to all individuals in the United States not only
as consumers or potential consumers but also as taxpayers.
Second, each person will have some encounter with the healthcare system.
Individuals may seek treatment from a physician, may aid a friend or loved one in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

seeking treatment. Even if an individual does not see a physician or have any direct
involvement with healthcare, he is likely paying for it for others. Therefore, each person
has some interest in healthcare whether he realizes it or not.
Healthcare is delivered by a system comprised of governmental entities, insurance
companies, hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, physicians, patients, et cetera. Each
entity has the theoretical end of achieving health for patients. But this phenomenon is
most apparent in the clinical encounter between the physician and the patient.
The relationship between physician and patient is among the most intimate
relationships between human beings. A physician may be privileged to information
about his patient that no partner, parent, or friend would be privy to. Pellegrino describes
the clinical encounter between a physician and a patient as, “The confrontation of doctors
and patients whose lived worlds intersect in the moment of clinical truth. This is the
omega point upon which the actions of individual doctors as well as the whole healthcare
system converge” (Pellegrino 2001, 560). In the clinical encounter the physician is in part
a gate keeper to the vast resources of the healthcare system. He decides what tests and
treatments to prescribe. An individual patient is not sufficiently authorized to order his
own tests or write his own prescriptions. Therefore, it is critically important to evaluate
how physicians make clinical decisions within such a vast system. This is the subject of
inquiry for this thesis.
We seek to identify the precise point where the physician and the patient meet and
make decisions to achieve the good end of health for the patient. This point is the clinical
encounter and within the clinical encounter a physician is called to make critical ethical
decisions that will have great bearing on his patient’s goal of attaining health.
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Additionally, the decisions made in the clinical encounter may affect other entities as part
of the systematic delivery o f healthcare.
Throughout this work differing ethical theories for how doctors should best
achieve the good end of their practice are considered. Some argue that despite the
magnitude and influence o f the healthcare system that these influences are external and
should be set aside while doctors and patients resolve ethical conundrums arising from
the clinical encounter. Others argue that external influences are important to the clinical
encounter but should be treated in a way that minimizes their influence on the clinical
encounter if considering external forces biases the physician or the patient toward making
ethically sound medical decisions inconsistent with the ultimate good end of achieving
health.
This work is most concerned with how physicians make ethical decisions in the
clinical setting. How do they identify what is ethically relevant and what is not? How
well do they ascertain what is important for their patient and what may be misguidance?
For the physician the nature o f good practice in medicine is important to our inquiry into
the ethics of clinical decision making. The physician acts as an artist in the application of
his knowledge to the current state of affairs including identifying all relevant particulars
to each case. Good practice, then, should be considered in a range from excellent to bad.
The spectrum would include medical practice that is bad, shoddy, mediocre, good, and
excellent.
For Aristotle, the hope for the professions or the artisans would be those who are
excellent in their practice of their art. Excellence in artful practice encompasses the
application of theoretical wisdom to a particular case using practical wisdom well. The
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nature of theoretical wisdom is its value neutrality. Theoretical wisdom is concerned
with what is true and false in the world, what is natural, universal, and unchangeable.
This realm o f knowledge includes science and math. But what theoretical wisdom lacks,
practical wisdom will complement and guide the medical practitioner toward the artful
activity of healing. Although medicine is chiefly influenced by science as theoretical
wisdom, practical wisdom is necessary to know when and how to use medical knowledge
and skill. Considering practical wisdom requires knowledge of what the good aim or
telos of the activity is.
Theoretical wisdom is concerned with what is and is not, while practical wisdom
is concerned with what should and should not be done in relation to the good aim of the
activity. Practical wisdom is the artful application of theoretical wisdom to novel or
unique circumstances. The application o f practical wisdom is the true test of the
excellent practitioner. Each particular case presents a new set of circumstances that will
vary in some degree from a “textbook” case. In these instances the practitioner is
charged with creatively and artfully applying his knowledge to this case.
Imagine a physician and a musician, specifically a flute player. Both the
physician and the flute player possess theoretical wisdom inherent with their activities of
healing or flute playing. The physician knows the physical nature of the human body and
what are necessary physical preconditions for the body to work well. The flutist also
knows the physical nature o f his flute and what necessary preconditions must be present
in order for his flute to play. The flutist knows that the flute is a tube with holes covered
by keys and that by blowing into the flute and holding certain keys different sounds are
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made, just as the physician knows that the body is a complex network of interconnected
biological systems yielding overall function of the body.
Both the physician and the flutist know what is fundamentally true theoretically.
Now they can apply their aptitude and skill to their respective activities. For the flutist to
be excellent he must not only know how the flute works, but must also know how to
make certain notes in certain sequences to make music that is excellent, rather than an
unpleasant screeching sound. The spectrum of good work applies to the flutist as it does
to the physician. A novice flutist may play badly, but with practice get better. However,
some flutists will become excellent and innovative in their flute playing because they
have a natural aptitude towards excellence in their art. The same holds true for
physicians.
Mastery of the knowledge of medicine is only one part of the puzzle necessary to
practice well in medicine. Situations will arise where the physician is at a loss for how to
apply his theoretical wisdom well. He strives for excellence, but may be at a loss as to
how to achieve the good aim of his activity when all the additional theoretical wisdom in
the world is not going to guide him.
For physicians and practitioners of an art, standards are articulated to evaluate
how good their work is.
The activities of chess players, physicians, and navigators are evaluated by
standards that reflect the nature of their activity and the state of knowledge of the
activity at the time. Such standards are by no means independent of the activities
they govern. Practice in these areas is known to be imperfect in certain ways, yet
the standards governing the practices function as standards. They are
authoritative even though they are recognized as changeable and improvable. It is
not true in general that effective standards by which activities are evaluated must
be independent of those activities (Wallace 1996, 64).
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Standards of practice surround each activity in which we are engaged. As Wallace points
out, evaluating good practice is not independent of the activity itself, but considered in
relation to the activity and toward the aim of the activity. The question is how to apply
the standards and rules, and when are we justified in breaking them or deviating from
them?
This work evaluates how the physician functions in accord with the standards of
his profession in working towards a good ultimate goal for his patient.

It is necessary

to state essential principles that often come into conflict in resolving real ethical problems
in medicine. Beauchamp articulated four principles for the physician in the clinical
encounter: veracity, privacy, confidentiality, fidelity. Applying these principles to the
clinical encounter often elucidates other values or principles including autonomy,
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice.
It is appropriate to separate out these two sets of principles. The first set is of
most importance to the physician in informing his clinical judgment. Secondly, the larger
values apply to the system as a whole. For purposes of this evaluation, we are focused on
the physician. However, we will also consider the influence of ethical principles brought
to the clinical encounter by the patient and the system.
This thesis employs a qualitative approach to addressing the question of how
physicians make ethical decisions in the clinical setting. The first chapter introduces us
to medical morality generally describing deontology, teleology, internal and external
morality and how each o f these concepts weighs in on the physician’s moral practice.
The second and third chapters describe conventional and reflective morality using case
examples from clinical medicine where each approach can be used in resolving
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conundrums. The thesis will end with a conclusion elucidating the strengths and
weaknesses of both conventional and reflective morality. From this evaluation a hybrid
approach incorporating both schemes is articulated.
O f note, throughout the work, the words “dilemma” and “conundrum” will be
used somewhat interchangeably favoring conundrum as the more appropriate word to
describe a situation where a moral decision needs to be made. This distinction is
important as the word “dilemma” implies two options, usually a right and wrong option.
While “conundrum” is more appropriate in most cases as many situations in medical
ethics do not have a clearly right or wrong approach. Rather whatever decision is
evaluated based on a pluralistic application of certain principles that are relatively
important to a particular case.
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CHAPTER 2

MEDICAL MORALITY: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF HEALTHCARE, INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL MORALITY
In this chapter we outline the foundation for this discussion on ethics concerned
with physicians making clinical decisions. The first idea we must consider is the very
notion of health, what it is, and how a physician helps a patient act toward the good end
of health. Next, we will briefly consider the Aristotelian notion of good work in a
profession and how this notion is integrated into the physician’s practice. Building on
that we then will review physician ethics, and conclude with an introduction to a couple
of moral schemes in clinical decision making: internal and external morality.
Health as the Good End of Medicine
Of most concern to physicians is the notion of health, ensuring it, restoring it, and
working towards it. Therefore a discussion of what constitutes health will enlighten us as
we consider the activities of physicians and patients toward the end of health.
Health is accepted as the end of the activity of the physician’s practice of
medicine. This end is accepted as a good and universal end, good in that health is sought
so that the body and soul may experience rational being and life, and universal in scope
as all humans and animals experience a relative state of health.
Health is the state of being whereby a person is able to function to the best of his
natural abilities. A state of health is recognizable by others and attainable in the sense
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that medicine, nutrition, exercise, behavioral changes, et cetera, may restore a state of
health from an unhealthy state. Leon Kass writes.
Health is a natural standard or norm - not a moral norm, not a value as opposed to
a fact, not an obligation, but a state o f being that reveals itself in activity as a
standard of bodily excellence or fitness, relative to each species and to some
extent to individuals, recognizable if not definable, and to some extent attainable
(Kass 1975, 30).
Considering Kass, health is a relative state of optimal being recognizable to oneself and
to others. Kass furthers his definition by establishing that the true opposite of health is
“unhealth” rather than disease (Kass 1975,20-21). Having a disease does not make one
unhealthy per se. Health is not established by the absence of ailment or disease, because
it is indeed possible for a person to be unhealthy absent physical ailment. Conversely, it
is certainly possible that a person may be afflicted with a disease and still meet the
optimum of their natural tendencies apparently unencumbered by a disease. This can be
seen with certain HIV-positive patients or cancer patients in the early stages of their
disease. Not only do they not appear to be unhealthy to others, they may not feel
unhealthy and may continue to function to the optimum of their potential.
It is the patient, not medicine or the physician, who ultimately realizes whether he
are healthy or not. Lack of medical justification for an individual’s claim that he is
unhealthy is insufficient to render the patient’s claim false. There could be a number of
different influences affecting a patient’s perception o f health yielding a feeling of un
health that is not measurable, and consequently may not be alleviated by any external
actor.
It is important to establish that health is relative and only fully experienced by
patients. Physicians should have primary concern over the necessary preconditions that
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must be present in the body and mind to promote the realization of health in the patient.
In addition to strong technical knowledge of the physical processes of the body they also
must apply their knowledge and skill in an artful manner.
Excellence in Clinical Medicine: Medicine as Healing Art
The end of the medical activity is the health of the patient. Ultimately actions
working towards health result from an internal morality concerned with the activity
toward the good. Internal morality occurs whenever an individual makes a moral
decision to act. The sphere of internal morality expands as the moral agent invites friends
or counsel (such as a physician) into the internal moral praxis. Those parties to the
internal activity are the physician and the patient, but this fact does not exclude external
norms from informing the activity toward the good end of health.
The physician’s profession is healing. Healing is an artful activity as it
incorporates not only theoretical wisdom (knowledge of universal and unchanging
information) but techné (skill, art, craft). Theoretical wisdom is taught, while techné is
acquired through practice. A good physician is one who has an aptitude to acquire
knowledge and the skill of medicine and uses these in an artful manner. Deciding how to
use this knowledge and skill is where healing becomes artful and actions by physicians
become ethical. Beyond diagnosis and treatment is the question o f a practical nature on
how to use knowledge in particular cases. This is the point where physicians must be
informed by ethics in making clinical decisions.
Despite the acquisition of medical knowledge and skill, the physician by himself
is still not able to restore health to a sick person. The patient must work toward the good
of health too. In many cases, the physician becomes a teacher or a coach, and the patient

10
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a student. The physician possesses the knowledge of what needs to be done to maintain
or restore health, but the patient must take learned advice in order to realize the good of
health. The ultimate experience of the good of health rests with the patient, while the
physician merely helps the patient along toward achieving that good. This truth refutes
those who would purport that health is the sole concern of the physician. Certainly,
restoring health in others is the goal o f any good physician, but the physician cannot
instill health in others without their participation, consent, and desire.
There are two critical elements to the physician’s ability to practice medicine:
knowledge and skill. There must be a range of competence or excellence in the use o f the
physician’s practice as well. A physician’s work may be evaluated on a range beginning
with what constitutes bad or shoddy work, competence, good work, and ending in
excellence. Determining where a physician falls in this range is a matter of assessing
how well the physician applied his knowledge and skill to any particular case.
Medicine, including knowledge of the physical preconditions necessary for a
body to work well, is a matter of science or theoretical wisdom. This form of knowledge
is generally universal in that the normal function of cells, organs, and bodily systems is
essentially the same in all humans. The physician in training first devotes his study to
how the body works, or should work. Then he begins to explore different diseases and
how the body can fail to work. Through this process he learns how to affect the systems
to restore natural functioning of the body. However, limitless knowledge about how the
body works does not inform how the physician may change the body’s processes to
restore health; this consideration is within the realm of skill.

11
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The skillful use of medical knowledge will result in knowing what is wrong and
what can or should be done to restore health. The looming question of what should be
done remains beyond the scope of theoretical wisdom or skill, and lies in ethics. To
answer these questions, a physician must rely on something beyond evidence-based
medicine. What lies in this realm beyond technical knowledge is practical knowledge
and ethics. Physicians, like members of any profession, acquire habits of practice while
in training and in practice. The concern for ethics is that these habits be aimed toward the
good. A physician may be considered ethically sound if he practices in a manner that is
consistent with working toward the good. Further, a good physician with good ethical
habits may make predictable actions consistent with working toward the good aim of
medical practice.
Physician Ethics
As a practitioner o f the healing art, a physician is charged with determining how
his knowledge and skill can be used to help others restore, attain, or maintain health.
Additionally, physicians as members of the profession of medicine are bound to the
ethical rules governing their profession. They are also bound by societal norms as
members of the community where they live and work.
Professional ethics, applicable to all professionals including physicians, are
categorized in two main themes: deontology and teleology. Deontology is a moral theory
concerned with duty whereby actions are deemed right or wrong without appeal to their
consequences; some acts are right regardless of their results. Immanuel Kant’s theory of
the categorical imperative and maximizing good ends is a deontological theory. Ends in
this context are not contingent on inclination; rather they are absolute, objective, and

12
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universal. For Kant autonomy and respect for others, or more specifically respect for
others’ rights are paramount (Arrington 1998, 226, 292, 380). Therefore, any act that
works against the rights of others is morally impermissible. Since right and wrong acts
are absolute, the empirical consequences of action become irrelevant in evaluating the act
for moral soundness in accord with dutiful action.
Teleology is the theory attributed to Aristotle where activity aims at some
ultimate end or good, the telos. “Every art or applied science [techné] and every
systematic investigation, and similarly every action and choice [proairesis], seem to aim
at some good” (NE 1094al). Aristotle’s theory invites that human behavior is aimed at
achieving some good or ultimate end. Aristotle outlined health as an intrinsic good
desirable for its own sake. Additionally, activity towards the good of health, surgery for
example, is an instrumental good as surgery is a means to the good of health. Plato
further considered health itself as an instrumental good as it was a necessary precondition
to other ends including love, pleasure, or anything desired because of its own qualities
(Arrington 1998, 65).
The employment o f these two themes is decided through a moral thought process
classified as either conventional or reflective considering both internal and external
values applicable to the situation. Conventional morality is the general term applied to
professional deliberation where the professional contemplates how the normative values
or rules of his profession apply to the case at hand. For instance, a physician may
consider the rule o f confidentiality as elemental and may never breach it under any
circumstances. In this case the physician is more concerned with adhering to the rule,
despite the good or bad results from pedantically following the rule.

13

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reflective morality considers first the relevant particulars of any given situation
where action is called for. After assessing the particulars then the decision maker will
look to normative values for guidance in resolving the moral conundrum. This form of
morality is also referred to as “reflective equilibrium,” attributed to John Rawls. The term
reflective equilibrium suggests that numerous values, beliefs, moral principles, and
theoretical postulates exist and will come into conflict in particular cases. The better
moral decision will strive for balance or equilibrium among the applicable values toward
the most coherent justification for any moral act (Beauchamp 2001a, 398).
Internal morality is the term used to describe the moral actions or decisions used
in certain activities. For example, although two parties are present during the clinical
encounter (patient and physician), the act at hand is the act of healing and the practice of
medicine. This activity carries with it notions of morality internal to the concern of the
purpose o f the activity (teleology). Teleological considerations are those concerned with
the ultimate end or good of any particular activity. In medicine, the act o f healing or the
act of practicing medicine constitutes the techné or the artful application of knowledge
and skill towards a good end. “Since there are many activities, arts, and sciences, the
number of ends is correspondingly large: of medicine the end is health...” (NE 1094a78). The practice o f medicine is not an intrinsic good, its aims are good. The good end for
medicine is health and health is the telos of medical practice. Treatment and surgery are
intermediate goods in that they are a means to a greater good.
Internal morality is concerned with the moral agent achieving the good he is
striving for. Often is the case that an individual seeks counsel with others, either fi-iends
or someone considered wise or knowledgeable. With the addition of advice from others

14
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the deliberation remains internal because both actors are seeking the same good. For
example, the physician-patient relationship constitutes an internal moral praxis because
both parties seek the good end (health) regardless of approaching any moral conundrum
from different perspectives. The action of both the physician and patient is aimed at the
good. The relevant values in internal morality include those constituting considered
judgments brought to the contemplation by either the physician or the patient or both.
External morality considers the effect of normative values outside of the internal
moral praxis or outside the practice of medicine. Examples include the values of the
community, churches, hospitals, families, the government and anything outside of the
individuals’ moral sphere. In a physician-patient relationship where external morality
played an influential role, both the physician and the patient would heavily consider the
imposition of external will on their decisions regarding healthcare. For example, a poor
man on Medicaid who needs a heart transplant in the state of Nevada will be denied
access to such a procedure because (1) heart transplants are not performed in the state of
Nevada, and such a procedure would have to be undergone out-of-state and out-of
network; (2) Medicaid will not cover out-of-state or out-of-network treatment. Since
Medicaid refuses to pay for a heart transplant out of network and the patient is too poor to
pay for the procedure himself, the patient has been denied access to care based on values
external to the physician and the patient.*
Ethics uses these concepts to both describe and prescribe moral decisions and
deliberation that physicians face pursuant to their role as professionals. Morality enters
into any professional-client relationship when all of the technical information the
professional possesses has been accessed, and a choice must be made in what to do for
' This case adapted from the case o f Troy Shaw reported in the Las Vegas Sun on October 24, 2006.

15
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professional possesses has been accessed, and a choice must be made in what to do for
the patient or client. Often a physician becomes frustrated when choices on how to treat
a particular patient cannot be easily explained without additional knowledge of the
subject. Instead, the physician is forced to make a judgment considering other factors
outside the science o f medicine, but squarely in the practice o f medicine. This situation
constitutes the art o f healing, or the artful application of knowledge to different cases.
An example of the point where excellence requires art over technique lies with the
flute player. At some point a flute player will not become better at playing the flute by
amassing more knowledge about how the flute actually works. Knowing how to play the
flute and playing the flute well require something more than mere knowledge of how a
flute works.
The same is true for physicians. Physicians are endowed with vast knowledge
about how the human body works. Physicians are also trained in methods for restoring
the body to a state of optimal functionality when health is compromised. How a
physician goes about diagnosing and treating patients requires techné or the artful
application of scientific knowledge. How the physician applies his knowledge and skill
is what separates a competent physician from an excellent physician. With the excellent
flute player, additional theoretical wisdom will not increase his ability to play the flute.
What is required to complement the theoretically wise physician is practical wisdom,
wisdom in understanding how to artfully apply his knowledge and skill to novel cases.
Doctors are faced with decisions that are not medical as much as they are ethical.
When no more data will make a difference in whatever choices are available, and a
choice must be made, the decision is ethical. In clinical medicine, physicians then must

16
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draw from the body of values and norms applicable to medicine, society, and the
particular patient in the particular circumstances. Once the physician has gathered these
factors then he may work to resolve whatever ethical conflicts have arisen.
Consider the following case example as illustrative of the moral conundrums
physicians face:
A 5-year old girl had been a patient in a medical center for three years because of
progressive glomerulonephritis. She had been on chronic renal dialysis, and the
possibility o f a renal transplantation was considered. The effectiveness of this
procedure in her case was questionable. On the other hand, it was the feeling of
the professional staff that there was a clear possibility that a transplanted kidney
would not undergo the same disease process. After discussion with the parents, it
was decided to proceed with plans for transplantation. Tissue typing was
performed on the patient; it was noted that she would be difficult to match. Two
siblings, age 2 and 4, were thought to be too young to serve as donors. The girl’s
mother turned out not to be histocompatible. The father, however, was found to
be quite compatible with his daughter. He underwent an arteriogram, and it was
discovered that he had anatomically favorable circulation for transplantation. The
nephrologists met alone with the father and gave him these results. He informed
the father that the prognosis for his daughter was quite uncertain. After some
thought, the girl’s father decided that he did not wish to donate a kidney to his
daughter. He admitted that he did not have the courage, and that particularly in
view of the uncertain prognosis, the very slight possibility of a cadaver kidney,
and the degree of suffering his daughter had already sustained, he would prefer
not to donate. The father asked the physician to tell everyone else in the family
that he was not histocompatible. He was afraid that if they knew the truth, they
would accuse him of allowing his daughter to die. He felt that this would ‘wreck
the family.’ The physician felt very uncomfortable about this. However, he
agreed to tell the man’s wife that “for medical reasons” the father should not
donate a kidney (Levine et al 1977 4).

This case illustrates a multifaceted moral conundrum that medical knowledge cannot
address. The relevant scientific or medical facts have been fully vetted. The decisions
elucidated in this case are not matters of medical science, but of morality.
All principles of medical ethics come into play here. Values and principles for
healthcare generally include the notions of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and
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justice. For the physician as practitioner, the professional values of veracity, privacy,
confidentiality, and fidelity to his patients critically collide in this case. Addressing each
of the values shows us the moral tension that any case in medicine may bring. And as we
will see, the mere knowledge of the values does not inform how they should be applied in
particular cases.
From a deontological perspective, the above case would be ethically evaluated by
carefully considering the general duties of the physician. The physician then would be
well versed in his duties as a physician and seek how to meet those obligations given
these circumstances.
Alternatively, or in many cases interchangeably, the case may be evaluated from a
teleological perspective, whereby the chief concern is activity toward a good end. Health
is the good end of the activity of medicine, so in evaluating a clinical case teleologically,
whatever action would bring the patient closest to health would be the right course of
action.
Considering a clinical case either deontologically or teleologically brings our
focus to what would dictate a certain action over another. What would be more
appropriate at this point would be a discussion of how each principle is evoked by this
case. At other points in this work, we will analyze different methods for moral
deliberation in clinical ethics. In the meantime, however, let us consider first the general
principles applicable to healthcare, then those applicable to the physician’s particular
decision.
Autonomy is the principle that applies almost universally in healthcare. In this
case, the autonomy o f this minor patient is absent as law has decided that she is not
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decisions and obligations for her well being fall to her legal surrogates, her parents.
What is evoked in this case is the autonomous choice of the father. He does not have to
give up his kidney to his daughter, and she cannot make a legal claim on it either. No
one can force the father to give up his kidney; this is his choice and his autonomy is
intact.
Beneficence applies to healthcare generally as a quality that seeks to help in
healing. Despite motivations for profit by some healthcare entities, the basic mission is
to work in healing. More broadly construed, however, beneficence is the charitable act of
helping. In professional settings where physicians are paid for their services, the
charitable nature of their service is not as applicable. Regardless, though, physician
knowledge and skill are considered not to be proprietary as they were acquired through
public sacrifice through public subsidy of medical training programs, state-sanctioned
monopoly on the practice of medicine through medical licensing, and the mere
submission of patients for the physician to train on. All of these indicate a public interest
in training physicians; therefore those who receive the training are not allowed to use it
only for their own enrichment (Pellegrino 1993, 45).
In this case, the physician is adhering to beneficence, but the father is not. The
father is not willing to give up a kidney for his daughter’s sake. Strict utilitarian
consideration of this case would conclude that the father’s reluctance and the physician’s
secrecy are morally permissible. Utilitarianism demands the most benefit for the greatest
number involved. Since the father is unwilling, it would not be to his benefit to donate the
kidney (Beauchamp 2001a, 342).
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But we must consider the effect of unrealized potential benefit. If the father did
donate the kidney the daughter would surely benefit. In time the father may realize that
the sacrifice of his kidney to save his daughter’s life will benefit him in the future. Such
may be the case and should be included in a thorough discussion with the father
regarding the full impact of his decision. Regardless, if the father remains unwilling to
donate as he lacks courage to undergo the operation, he may eventually feel a tremendous
amount o f regret. If this is likely then the father will experience personal shame and
harm. If all other conditions o f the physician-patient relationship are intact with the
father, then the physician has an obligation to not cause harm to the father as well.
In this case the notion of nonmaleficence is present as well. To do no harm is the
physician’s mantra and has been since Hippocrates. The harm in this case comes from
the consequences if the physician violates the father’s claim to confidentiality. As the
father asserts, the family could be severely harmed if they knew o f the father’s favorable
donor status. But is it not reasonable to argue that the long-term guilt the father may
experience would be harmful to him as well? As asserted in the previous paragraph,
there could be yet unrealized harm to the family or the father following the inevitable
outcome of his decision not to donate. To make this determination, though, the
physician would have to ascribe certain values to the father that the father may not have.
For instance, it would seem reasonable that most fathers would be willing to give up a
kidney to save their child. But is it not also possible that a reasonable father would be as
reticent as this father is? After all, the father asserts that donating the kidney is not to his
benefit, so for the family or the physician to try to force it out o f him would constitute
harm.
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Another point, however, is that the physician is now party to a conspiracy in lying
to the mother about the father’s donor status. As the mother of the minor patient, as
surrogate, she has a right to know the status of her daughter’s health. But the mother
does not have a right to know about the status of her husband’s health. For the physician
to intercede in this relationship could wreak harm on the family.
Justice is a principle in healthcare according to which those who need care should
be able to get it. Justice is concerned with notions of fairness and equity in healthcare
delivery. In this case, the daughter needs a kidney, the father is a suitable donor, yet he is
unwilling to donate. This seems unfair and unjust. The patient has been receiving care,
and the system is doing everything it can to try to alleviate her disease. It is still possible
for a kidney to come available from a source other than the father. However, it must be
considered in this case that it would also be unjust to manipulate or coerce the father to
donate his kidney.
In addition to the application of more universal healthcare principles generally,
the physician must also answer to a number of values applicable to his profession and his
role in this patient’s care. In this case the physician’s duty to veracity is the most
pressing moral question. Veracity dictates that a physician must be honest and forthright
regarding the tme status of a patient’s condition. Additionally, the physieian must explore
and explain all treatment options known to him, even those he cannot himself provide
(Beauchamp and Childress 2001a, 283-292). This principle requires that the physician
make true and accurate statements about a patient’s health, diagnosis, prognosis, and
treatment.
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In this case, the physician is being asked to withhold information critical to the
care of his patient. It can be argued that the father is not the patient in this case.
However, the physician is privy to confidential medical information and would be the one
performing the transplants should that happen, thereby establishing a physician-patient
relationship with the father. Since the physician-patient relationship applies, the
physician is bound by the other principles of confidentiality, privacy, and fidelity to the
father as well as to the daughter.
It would be considered coercive and deceptive for the physician to breach the
father’s confidentiality, in this case thus violating veracity. Again, the physician cannot
force the kidney out o f the father. The physician, though, can discuss at length with the
father the consequences of his decision, and would indeed seem to have an obligation
under the notion of veracity and fidelity to make certain that the father fully understands
the ramifications o f his decision, including consideration of the potential long-term
damage to his own conscience and to his family. But even if, after this full disclosure of
the risks and benefits, the father remains unwilling, then the physician is not justified in
violating this principle in this case.
Our discussion on veracity plays well into the other principles for this physician
to consider in this case, including privacy and confidentiality. It would seem that privacy
and confidentiality are the same thing, but there are sufficient distinctions that warrant
treating these two values separately.
Privacy is considered an inherent right of any patient that should be respected and
protected by the physician. Privacy is breached with the consent of the patient in allowing
the physician to engage in an exam and investigation o f the patient’s condition of health.
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Through this examination and inquiry, information is gathered that is then considered
confidential and may be released only with the consent o f the patient. Here lies the
critical distinction. Privacy is inherent, while confidentiality is protected by law and
permission to share private information is granted by the patient. So, confidentiality is a
right asserted, rather than retained inherently.
In this case the father’s privacy and confidentiality are of central concern to the
physician. The father could have decided not to have been tested for histocompatibility
with his daughter, but since he was, the information is now available to the doctor. Then
the father asserts his right to keep the information confidential. The physician then must
ascertain whether he is allowed to share this information without the patient’s consent,
and in this case, there is no justification to breach the confidentiality.
It would have to be the case that breaching the father’s confidentiality would have
a net benefit to the daughter. There would be no way for the physician to be able to
assess whether or not releasing the father’s information to the mother would in some way
influence the father to donate. Even if this is what the physician thought might happen,
releasing the information would likely be used coercively against the father. Under a
coercive circumstance, the father is still not a willing donor and his autonomy is not
maintained.
It is often the case while considering norms of veracity, privacy, and
confidentiality, that precedents are set when the system or a physician violates these
principles. In a more global sense, would potential donors be less willing to submit to
compatibility testing if they knew their status would be disclosed against their will?
Suppose that a family member was not histocompatible with the daughter, but by virtue
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of the testing was determined to be a good candidate for kidney donation for another
person in the facility. The potential donor relaxed his right to privacy for a specific
purpose. It would be inappropriate to think that anyone submitting to compatibility
testing would then be offering up their kidney to any person who may need it. If the
physician disclosed a donor’s status to other potential recipients, would this breach have a
chilling effect on people’s submitting for compatibility testing? Even if the possibility
that it would were remote, any precedent that dissuaded potential donors from being
tested would have far-reaching impact on the system o f organ procurement and
transplantation.
Maintaining confidentiality in the physician-patient relationship is critically
important to the success of any physician-patient relationship. If there is a sense that
physicians cannot be trusted, then physicians will not be able to put the benefit of their
knowledge and skill into full and good use for any single patient or the greater
community. In addition to protecting their patient’s trust by protecting their privacy,
physicians are also obligated to remain loyal to their patients. Thus enters the value of
fidelity.
Fidelity is the notion o f loyalty of the physician to the patient. In practice
adherence to this notion requires that the physician place the best interests of his patient
above self-interest and above the interests of others. Fidelity is closely linked with
beneficence for the loyalty in question is to the patient’s best interests including the good
end of medical practice, the benefit of attaining health.
Clearly in this case, the physician’s loyalties are divided between treating the
daughter and accommodating the father’s confidentiality claim. The physician is
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obligated to treat the daughter and remain loyal to her best interests. What frustrates this
situation is that her best treatment is a transplant and a good donor is the father;
everything the physician needs to treat this patient well is present, except that the donor is
reluctant. The physician must maintain loyalty to his patient and to the father’s right to
confidentiality. To violate the father’s confidentiality would be disloyal to the father and
would not benefit the patient.
O f importance in applying this principle to this case is the fact that the physician
is not being disloyal to the daughter by not sharing the father’s donor status with the rest
of the family. His fidelity is maintained since he has been fully honest with the family
about the daughter’s condition. He is not shirking his loyalty to her by keeping her
father’s secret. He would violate fidelity only if he put another’s interests above that of
the patient. In this case the father is putting his own interests above that of his daughter.
If fidelity has been violated it has been violated by the father against his daughter. It
could be said that the physician is a party to this, but in this instance the more pressing
moral agent is the father. The daughter cannot do anything to affect her own realization
of the benefit o f health. The daughter is without autonomy and subjugated to the moral
acts of her parents and therefore has no status as a moral agent except that she would
benefit from her father’s kidney donation.
Although the physician acts as a moral agent in any clinical encounter, he is only
bound by the morality of his profession as a physician and values of the community
where he practices. The physician has met his moral obligation to this patient and this
family in this case.
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The only fact that would have made a difference is whether or not the physician
knew with some degree of certainty that violating the father’s right to confidentiality
would have made the difference in convincing him to become a willing donor. It is
important that the father would have to come around on his own accord and not as the
result o f coercion. The physician, then, should strive toward a middle ground persuasion
fully discussing the consequences of the father’s act.
In any case the physician must have justification for violating a principle of
medical ethics. In all cases, the physician must ascertain to what extent each principle
applies and must order the principles to balance with the limits of the medical profession
and the normative values of the patient. In each case the patient is a unique moral being
whom the physician must accommodate. Conversely, the physician has obligations to his
profession and community as well. This is the omega point for healthcare, and these
decisions are not medical; they are ethical.
This single case has elucidated the values and principles of the healthcare system,
the medical profession, and the patients. Additionally, this case has shown how clinical
decisions in medicine are ethically complicated. As is often the case, critical questions in
medical ethics have life-and-death effects. Because the stakes are so high in many of
these cases, critical inquiry into the methods for resolving medical-ethical dilemmas
becomes important.
Through the rest of this work, we will explore different approaches towards
reconciling the ethical with the medical. Chiefly, we will evaluate notions of
conventional and reflective morality.
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Morality in Medicine: Intemalism and Extemalism
Internal morality pertaining to physicians can be described as follows, “Clinical
medicine is a professional practice governed by a moral framework consisting of goals
proper to medicine, role specific duties, and clinical virtues. We call this framework the
IMM [Internal Morality of Medicine]. The professional integrity of physicians is
constituted by loyalty and adherence to the IMM” (Miller and Brody 2001, 588).
External morality considers norms and values outside the immediate clinical
encounter. “Public opinion, law, religious institutions, and philosophical ethics have all
served as sources of external morality. When applied to biomedicine, appeals to external
morality usually reflect social concerns about moral failures and abuses” (Beauchamp
2001b, 607).
Most medical ethicists fall into three seemingly natural camps in terms of
prevailing moral theories: essentialist-intemalists, externalist-value pluralists, and hybrid
theories. The first theory we will consider is internal morality.
Internal Morality
Internal morality o f medicine can be categorized into four accounts: essentialist,
practical precondition, historical professionalism, and an evolutionary perspective.
The essentialist account most appropriately includes Pellegrino’s philosophy of
medicine existing as a phenomenon known to man extending beyond man’s ability to
control. In other words, medicine has a nature that is discovered by man, and is defined
by its ends and purposes. An internal morality following from Pellegrino’s essentialist
argument would be realized by medicine’s practitioners upon reflection on the “proper”
nature, goals, and ends of medicine (Arras 2001, 645).
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“Essentialism claims, in brief, that careful reflection on the very nature of
medicine as a practice, including reflection on its ends or goals, can yield a serviceable
medical ethic” (Arras 2001, 645). From this reflection, physicians would tackle some
practical problems in medicine and would likely realize the fundamental tenets of
medical ethics, including fulfilling the duty o f the healer; resisting influences from
external sources (i.e., managed care organizations, hospitals, and society at large)
affecting the physician’s autonomy or judgment, only engaging in those activities as
physicians with the purpose o f healing or alleviating suffering. Conversely physicians
should not use medical knowledge or skill in activities not aimed at the ultimate good of
health (some cosmetic surgery, some abortions, and lethal injections, et cetera) (Arras
2001,645).
In the essentialist account the notion of the professional plays a central role.
Because of an inherent asymmetry of power between the physician and the patient, the
physician has a higher moral responsibility to act as a good custodian of the medical
power and remain judicious in its use.
Fundamental to this account is heavy reliance on the moral character of the
individual physician. The physician is charged as a moral agent whose purpose is to act
towards the good o f health in all cases. Therefore, essentialist internal morality requires
that the physician develop sound habituation toward the end of the medical activity.
Such habituation is inherent in the moral character o f the physician, and developed in
training and practice.
Another account of internal morality is the practical precondition account for
what is necessary to constitute the practice of medicine. For example, a practical
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precondition would include something foundational to the physician-patient relationship
absolutely necessary in order for the relationship to succeed. Arras presents the example
of a physician who evidences scrupulous adherence to the duty of confidentiality as a
precondition of a physician patient-relationship (Arras, 2001, 646). His reasoning is that
without trust between the physician and the patient the physician cannot properly execute
her role as physician without the faith and trust of the patient. If a patient is not honest
with his physician she will be hindered in providing the best care possible and ultimately
working toward the health of the patient. If the patient cannot trust that what he tells his
physician is held in the strictest confidence, and confidentiality is something he desires,
then his health will be diminished. So the physician must maintain absolute
confidentiality o f the patient in order to preserve an effective physician-patient
relationship. Thus, confidentiality is a practical precondition to the therapeutic
relationship.
Internal morality in some forms comes about considering the history of the
profession. Historical professionalism is best described as doctors making the morality
for other doctors. Physicians establish the acceptable norms for the profession, deriving
their duties not from higher virtues but from norms acceptable to the profession. What
follows then is a body of professional values constituting an agreement among the
members of the profession on what the profession will and will not do. A prime example
of this is the Code o f Medical Ethics authored by the American Medical Association.
This type of internal morality would entertain only external values or virtues that
members of the profession itself thought were relevant to their professional roles (Arras
2001, 648). The authority for these rules is derived from membership in the profession.
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This type of internal morality would square with deontology, whereby the physician
follows the rules o f the profession with limited consideration of the nature, origin, or
moral authority o f the rules themselves.
Finally, internal morality is seen to expand and evolve to accommodate modem
values. The evolutionary perspective for internal morality brings together a
“conversation” within the profession of medicine and the larger society. The evolutionary
perspective would reject the core ethic that medicine exists eternally; rather, the values
applicable to medicine exist in the current time and place as the result of a dialectical
conversation between the medical profession and society.
The evolutionary perspective may take a tenet such as a duty to treat the sick as a
coalescence o f the expectation of society that physicians heal the sick. This obligation to
society is strengthened by the fact that physicians are licensed and given an exclusive
state-protected monopoly to the practice of medicine. By virtue of the privilege of
licensure, the profession owes its services to the society that is protecting its profession
from incompetent intrusion (Arras 2001, 649-650).
Additionally, the evolutionary perspective would allow limited intrusion of
external values and norms into the essentialist internal moral deliberation. However, in
sharp defense of internal morality, Edmund Pellegrino defends his essentialist account in
terms of appeal to higher virtues evidenced through the very nature of medicine.
External Morality
External morality, in contrast to internal morality, considers what other values or
norms may intercede during the clinical encounter. External morality may be useful in
more richly informing internal morality. Examples include religious values, laws, and
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ethical theory itself. In opposition to internal morality, which would assert that external
factors should not influence the clinical encounter, externalists invite consideration of
outside factors as weighing on the clinical encounter.
Ethical theory is an interesting external imposition to the clinical encounter.
“Many moral philosophers continue to think that if we could find a correct theory, we
could modify or construct medical ethics to conform. Ideally, a theory would be powerful
enough to justify the entire institution of medical morality” (Beauchamp 2001b, 607).
This statement challenges some notions of internal morality including essentialism and
historical professionalism, but falls in line with the evolutionary perspective of internal
morality.
A good ethical theory for medical ethics would, “Alert attentive persons to
concrete issues, identify the morally relevant features of circumstances, determine the
difference between morally acceptable and unacceptable solutions to problems, and show
which conditions are necessary and sufficient to justify the violation of a moral rule”
(Beauchamp 2001b, 607-8). Unlike internalist morality, the concern is applying the
rules, and not breaking them. As postulated here, an ethical theory must have a
mechanism to justify breaches in the rules.
The problem with ethical theory as an informative external moral factor is that
theory construction itself is suspect because it runs the risk of excluding potentially
relevant practical considerations. Beauchamp opines that no generally valid theory is
currently available. Beauchamp is more concerned with universality of moral codes for
medical practice. Rather Beauchamp suggests that a method for justifying certain acts
under certain circumstances is the more pressing ethical inquiry. Beauchamp further
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States that a sound ethical theory informing clinical ethics would include what he calls a
“coherent justified specification”. In this theory what is important is evaluating the
justifications for acting one way or another for coherence. Coherent justifications would
constitute a valid specification to any ethical rule or principle (Beauchamp and Childress
2001a, 399-406).
Further, theory and practice often collide in unproductive ways. Philosophers use
theory to explain and justify morality and to clarify moral concepts. The goal of moral
philosophers is not to solve practical problems. Many theories address philosophical
problems, not practical ones. Beauchamp asserts that the solution to this problem is not
to toss out philosophers and replace them with practitioners, rather, to bring the two
together to articulate a theory that can accommodate both internal and external values
applicable to medical practice (Beauchamp 2001b, 609).
External morality is more accommodating to communities and cultures with
different social values. Intemalism appeals to universal goods and ends, but individual
communities where doctors practice may not accept the universal goods and ends in the
same way. Intemalism cannot accommodate morally reasonable variances among
different groups of people. Consider here the difference between moral strangers and
moral friends. Moral strangers are those who interact in a way that is not informed with a
common morality leamed from similar social experiences. Moral friends, conversely,
share common experiences forming their common values and are better situated to
resolve moral conflicts as they arise.
Communities will weigh values differently considering medical topics including
blood transfusion, organ transplantation, use of herbal and holistic medicine, and spiritual
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healing. There is no way to justly reject differences in moral commitments to different
concepts of healing. “These norms have moral authority if and only if they are accepted
as authoritative by members of a community” (Beauchamp 2001b, 610). Without
justification, it is impermissible to impose a universal medical ethic that transcends
culture and history when culture and history are different among different communities.
However, excessive ethical pluralism may render medical ethics useless without
any single grounding principle. For example, if a community adopts a law absolutely
forbidding a physician to treat a patient without explicit consent, then the physician
would be proscribed from treating an unconscious patient in an emergency. This seems
counterintuitive to the value of beneficence. Excessive value pluralism in this regard
would seem to overemphasize autonomy at the expense of life saving.
Regardless of the relative values of each community, there are some features of
human beings that are indeed universal. This universality is the starting point for external
authority in medical ethics and “appeals to universal moral principles that are valid
independent of the perspective of particular communities and traditions of medical
practice and ethics” (Beauchamp 2001b, 612). Included in this idea are those elements
common to the human experience. All humans everywhere experience life, varying
degrees of liberty, and relative pursuit of happiness. Life is experienced without the
consent of the person. In other words, no one asked to be bom; it just happened and the
act of living is experienced on an individual basis. Moral communities place varying
degrees of importance on life. Some communities apply a utilitarian ethic on life, while
others engage in extraordinary efforts to maintain life. Liberty is closely related to
freedom of conscience. Many civil societies limit expressions of liberty. Happiness is
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highly relativistic depending on the normative values of any given moral community.
Each of these elements of life is common to the human experience. How different moral
communities respect these elements elucidates the moral values held by any particular
moral community. These are the features that the essentialists rely upon to justify their
universal precepts of the ends of medicine. The distinction here is that different
communities will weigh the importance of certain values differently.
Internal moralities are community-specific, but rely on universal precepts for their
justification. The important distinction here is justification. A moral precept is justified
if it is accepted; therefore the community must accept the precept, not because the
profession says so, but because the community accepts it as so. These moral precepts
become the considered moral judgments embodying basic ethical beliefs. Whatever a
community considers as its particular ethical principles proves valid for the community
that originates these precepts and agrees to follow them. It could be the case that
normative values violate higher virtues. Therefore, constant questioning of the precepts
and their justification is warranted rather than deontological acquiescence to practical
codes if a moral community desires to be more civil and just.
External morality requires a mechanism for specifying which moral norms have
been justified. “Specification is not a process of producing general norms; it assumes
that they are already available. It is the process of making these norms concrete so that
they can meaningfully guide conduct” (Beauchamp 2001b, 614). External morality does
not reject internal morality; instead it requires the application of internal morality to meet
the particular case and allows for justified specifications to accommodate attainment of
the goals of the professional practice. In this way external morality complements internal
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morality because ultimately the result of an internal moral praxis will determine the
action to be taken. Specification is essential to using abstract principles. For example, “a
physician must never violate patient confidentiality”. As courts have ruled, in certain
circumstances, psychiatrists are obligated to report potential harm to other persons if they
become aware that a valid threat is mentioned by a patient within the confines of the
physician-patient relationship. Hard and fast adherence to the rule is usurped by thirdparty safety, and considering this as a valid specification supports the need for flexibility
in moral reasoning that is available in external morality more so than internal morality
alone. Specification must always retain the original norm but add particulars.
As the authority of internalist moral norms must be justified, so must the
specifications for each norm. Morally sound persons will disagree on the application of
moral rules in particular cases. “We cannot hold persons to a higher standard than to
make judgments conscientiously in light of the relevant basic and specified norms and the
available evidence” (Beauchamp 2001b, 616). In these instances the judgment must be
made assessing all relevant facts and whatever justification for the specification must be
coherent.
Conclusion/Summary
Application of these moral schemes occurs through conventional and reflective
moral deliberation. However, doctors do not identify themselves as members of one
scheme or another. Most often, doctors resolve ethical conundrums relying on their own
experience as physicians and as members of a community. Ethicists use these various
theories to both describe and prescribe types of moral deliberation.
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CHAPTER 3

CONVENTIONAL MORALITY IN CLINICAL MEDICINE
As was outlined in the preceding chapter, ethical norms - including autonomy,
nomaleficence, beneficence, and justice - apply to healthcare overall. More specific
ethical norms - including veracity, privacy, confidentiality, and fidelity - additionally
apply to the physician in his role as physician.
Further, we outlined the features and differences of internal and external morality
in medicine, but left to this chapter to discuss manners in which we see these moral
methods applied. In practice, internal and external moral deliberations are considered
both in conventional and reflective ways. In this chapter we will explore internal and
external ethical reasoning applied in a conventional method.
Conventional Morality
Conventional morality is the application of normative values or principles and rules to
particular cases where some sort o f ethical conundrum is present. “To follow a
conventional morality is simply to be directed by traditional or customary rules or
practices without stopping to examine or criticize those rules or practices or customs”
(Callahan 1988,20). The rhetorical question for the professional in conventional
morality is “how do I apply the rules of professional conduct to this case”. This accepts
the idea that there are commonly articulated rules that pertain to this practice, and this
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practice’s ends (telos). The important feature of conventional morality is the absence of
critical reflection on the desirable ends the rules seek to attain.
Conventional moralists are considered deontologists even if their theories include
some consideration of the consequences as instructive to the decision to act. However,
strict adherence to the application o f ethical rules to particular cases constitutes
deontological conventional morality. Such a conventional morality is not as concerned
with the consequence of the moral act, as it is with adhering to the duty o f the profession
in following the mles. “Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect
expected from it nor in any principle of action that needs to borrow its motive from this
expected effect” (Kant 1993,401). This makes conventional morality more
deontological than teleological, because in pure teleology the good end is the goal, and
how to get there is the conundrum.
Deontological considerations should take place irrespective of the consequences; an
example would include Kant’s categorical imperative (Callahan 1988,22). When a
deontologist holds an act impermissible, the reasons to not perform the act are that it is
unjust, fraudulent, or otherwise wrong. In other words, the reason not to act is not
relevant to the ends or consequences of the act; rather it is that the act itself is not in
accord with the rules.
Conventions
Having established that health is the end of medicine, relative norms and values
are articulated to inform the activity toward that end - the conventions of medical
practice. To contemplate conventional morality we must accept the conventions or
normative values being considered. We have already stated what the conventions for
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healthcare ethics are: autonomy, nomaleficence, beneficence, and justice. Additionally,
ethical principles for physicians include veracity, privacy, confidentiality, fidelity^.
These abstract notions provide the grounding for medical ethics, but how to incorporate
these values into clinical practice requires further explanation.
Doctors, like any other professionals acquire ethical habits primarily through
learning and practicing their art. Through the evolution o f the practice of medicine, the
profession itself has artieulated its principles, and society has articulated what it expects
of medical professionals. The dynamic nature of medicine makes inquiry into the ethics
of medicine acutely relevant to life in modem society. The expanding power of the
medical art forces society to react to new techniques and procedures. The role of the
physician in society has changed, and what society expects from its doctors has changed
along with it.
This dynamism has incited leamed debate on the proper role for physicians. As a
function of historical professionalism, physicians continue to articulate the values for
their own profession. The Code o f Medical Ethics authored by the American Medical
Association represents the codification of normative values for physician practice.
Most professions have codes of ethics. The purposes of these codes are several.
First, they legitimize the professionals qua professional. By adhering to the code, the
professional can authoritatively state his claim on his professional status. Secondly, codes
offer a written escape route should professionals be asked to do something they find

^ Consideration o f any one o f these principles would provide ample fodder for thesis. For our purposes, I
accept these principles as “the” norms for clinical medicine. Any one o f them could be removed from any
paradigm by academic argument, but if such was the case, our discussion on ethical methodology would
not change. I adopted these principles chiefly from Principles o f Biomedical Ethics: 5'* Edition by T. L.
Beauchamp. In other research that I have done, I have not seen these principles refuted; rather the manner
in which they are applied is the subject o f debate among scholars in this field. Consequently, I find the
debate on the use o f these principles more interesting.
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unethical. Codes are most often produced by the profession itself, so they are more
centered on internal morality for the practice of their profession. Sometimes codes may
be used to accommodate expansions in the profession’s practice.
Code of Medical Ethics
The code is published every two years with whatever additions or subtractions
have been articulated by the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs and adopted by the
AMA’s House o f Delegates. The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs o f the AMA is
comprised of eight physicians and one non-physician, serving single-year terms,
supported by an expert staff. The council drafts the code of medical ethics and the final
code is approved by the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association.
The code’s preface includes the following qualifier outlining the scope and
purpose of the use of the code.
Medical ethics involve the professional responsibilities and obligations of
physicians. Behavior relating to medical etiquette or custom is not addressed in
the Code. The opinions which follow are intended as guides to responsible
professional behavior. No one Principle of Medical Ethics can stand alone or be
individually applied to a situation. In all instances, it is the overall intent and
influence of the Principles of Medical Ethics which shall measure ethical behavior
for the physician. Council opinions are issued under its authority to interpret the
Principles of Medical Ethics and to investigate general ethical conditions and all
matters pertaining to the relations of physicians to one another and to the public
(AMA 2002, viii).
Here the AMA is outlining the proper use of its code. O f interest, the AMA does not
suggest that this code should be binding on the physician, merely guiding. Further, the
AMA states that no single principle can stand alone.
The code lists nine principles of physician conduct:
1. A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical care, with
compassion and respect for human dignity and rights.
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2. A physician shall uphold the standards of professionalism, be honest in all
professional interaction, and strive to report physicians deficient in character or
competence, or engaging in fraud or deception, to appropriate entities.
3. A physician shall respect the law and also recognize a responsibility to seek
changes in those requirements which are contrary to the best interests of the
patient.
4. A physician shall respect the rights of patients, colleagues, and other health
professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences and privacy within the
constraints of the law.
5. A physician shall continue to study, apply, and advance scientific knowledge,
maintain a commitment to medical education, make relevant information
available to patients, colleagues, and the public, obtain consultations, and use the
talents o f other health professionals when indicated.
6. A physician shall, in the provision o f appropriate patient care, except in
emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the
environment in which to provide medical care.
7. A physician shall recognize a responsibility to participate in activities contributing
to the improvement of the community and the betterment of public health.
8. A physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to the patients
as paramount.
9. A physician shall support access to medical care for all people (AMA 2001, xiv).
We can consider these nine principles as conventions of medical practice articulated by
the profession itself. Within these statements, we see most of the principles of healthcare
previously outlined incorporated.
What is absent from the code is a mechanism for enforcement. The preamble
asserts that the code should stand as instructive, but limits itself as something not to be
taken too literally or applied universally. This would seem to suggest accommodation of
physicians relying more on their own judgment in novel cases rather than the code,
leaning toward reflective morality. But to invoke the code, and to follow the code, are to
use conventional morality, as the code constitutes norms for the profession.
Summarizing our conventions, we include the normative values applicable to
healthcare and physicians. Applying these conventions is a practice of the physician
through internal or external moralities, or both. Regardless of the form of the morality
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(internal or external) contemplating ethical questions in terms of how one follows the
rules results in a conventional moral praxis.
Applying Conventional Morality
Conventional morality does not exclude either internal or external morality.
Internal morality is concerned with decisions toward the good. For medicine, internal
morality is the deliberation between the physician and the patient about what medicine
can and cannot do toward the end of health. This practice would inherently consider the
conventions outlined here.
Although the physician is considering the normative values applicable to his
profession, he is not divorcing himself from the ethical rules. Therefore, when the
physician contemplates the values of the profession, although seeming to be external to
the clinical encounter, he is fulfilling his role as physician to this patient in this case.
Although the physician is considering moral rules for medicine that are extrinsically as
well as intrinsically applicable to the relationship, this contemplation does not count as
external morality.
External Proscription Against Abortion
A pregnant woman is admitted due to complications early in her pregnancy at a
non-profit hospital associated with the Catholic Church. She is less than twenty-two
weeks along in her pregnancy but has developed a life-threatening condition caused by
her pregnancy where she is at a high risk for death. Substantial medical evidence
indicates that a baby bom at twenty-two weeks or less has a very low survival rate and a
very high rate o f severe long term developmental problems both physically and mentally
if the baby does survive such a premature birth.
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In this case, the physicians determine that for the sake of the mother, the
pregnancy must be terminated. However, because of the hospital’s association with the
Catholic Church, an abortion is not an option pursuant to part four, directive forty-five of
the Ethical and Religious Directives fo r Catholic Health Care Services (ERDs)^ which
strictly forbids abortion under any circumstances.
The relevant medical facts in this case are that the mother is almost certain to die
or undergo severe suffering if she continues to be pregnant. The baby at this point is not
sufficiently developed to survive on its own without enormous hardship. Trying to
sustain the mother while pregnant to try to give the unborn baby more gestational time to
mature would negatively affect the health o f both the mother and unborn baby.
The relevant ethical concerns include the physician’s fidelity to treat the mother
and the concern for the health of the unborn child. Further, the ERDs constitute a new set
of conventions applicable to all healthcare services provided by institutions or persons
associated with the Catholic Church.
From an internal moral standpoint, there is justification to terminate the
pregnancy to save the mother. However, because of where the patient is located,
anything considered an abortion would be prohibited. The proscription against abortion is
an excellent example o f an external moral value affecting this clinical decision in this

^ The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Healthcare Services (“ERDs”) are the official Catholic
Church’s directives for all health care providers associated with the church in the United States. The
directives are authored by the United States Conference o f Catholic Bishops and are approved by the Pope.
The directives are binding to any hospital associated with the church and any provider with privileges to
practice at that hospital. Part four, directive 45 reads, “Abortion (that is, the directly intended termination
o f pregnancy before viability or the directly intended destruction o f a viable fetus) is never permitted.
Every procedure whose sole immediate effect is the termination o f pregnancy before viability is an
abortion, which, in its moral context, includes the interval between conception and implantation o f the
embryo. Catholic health care institutions are not to provide abortion services, even based upon the principle
o f material cooperation. In this context. Catholic health care institutions need to be concerned about the
danger o f scandal in any association with abortion providers.”
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case. Following this rule is a matter of conventional moral deliberation because the
concern is to treat the patient well, while still following the applicable norms or
conventions.
Regardless o f whether or not the mother is Catholic, or has similar feelings
against abortion, she is an in-patient of a Catholic hospital, so abortion is out. Further,
any physician treating her in this hospital has agreed to abide by the ERDs and has a duty
to follow the rules. It is reasonable to state that the physician’s duty is conflicted
between his fidelity to his patient and fidelity to the hospital and the rules governing their
practice.
What is ultimately decided by the ad hoc ethics committee dealing with this case
is to induce labor and accept the risks to the premature baby. For the mother’s health, the
pregnancy must end, somehow. Abortion is not an option, but inducement of labor is not
proscribed by the ERDs. After inducing labor, the mother’s health is slowly restored
after delivering a very premature baby. The baby does not survive.
This case illustrates the potential influence of external values. Additionally, the
deliberation on what to do in this case is constrained by obligations to comply with the
conventions o f the facility.
Further reading o f the relevant directive includes the statement, “Every procedure
whose sole immediate effect is the termination of pregnancy before viability is an
abortion” (ERD, part four directive 45). It would seem that this directive would proscribe
the act of inducing labor prior to viability as it constitutes an abortion. Despite the
significant body of evidence supporting that a baby bom after only twenty-two weeks
gestation would likely perish, there is also a possibility that the baby would survive.
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although likely with severe complications. In light of this later part of the directive, if the
“sole” intent were to terminate the pregnancy, the physician would be acting unethically
according to the directive. If the pregnancy were allowed to continue, though, the mother
would likely die, killing the unborn child as well. But this situation illustrates the ethical
tension in this case between the mother’s health, and the convention.
If the mother desired the abortion, she would have to go to another facility and
find another doctor. In this case, her condition was unstable, so a transfer was not
considered safe. Did the mother suffer more enduring labor than she would have
enduring an abortion? The intent o f inducing labor was to save the mother. The baby
might have lived.
Some ethicists have promulgated formulaic approaches to resolving clinical
ethical issues. Doctors are trained to make diagnoses and consider treatment options
using “evidence-based medicine”. Physicians use scientific approaches in diagnosing, so
it would seem to follow that resolving ethical issues in medicine should be done in a
similar, formulaic approach. To this end, Albert Jonsen, Mark Siegler, and William
Winslade proffer the “Four Topics Method” as a rubric for assessing ethical
considerations in clinical medicine.
The physician or whoever is charged with making the ethical decision in the
clinical encounter is tasked with identifying the relevant features of the case at hand
addressing four specific areas: medical indications, patient preferences, quality of life,
and contextual features. This method incorporates the general healthcare values of
autonomy, beneficence, nomaleficence, and justice, placing them by reference under
different subheadings.
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For example, beneficence and nomaleficence are listed under the “medical
indications” and “quality o f life” assessments. Autonomy is listed under “patient
preferences”, and justice and fidelity are listed under “contextual features”.
The first step in this method or any clinical encounter is to fully assess the
patient’s medical condition, or state of health. Essentially the question asks what the
medical condition is and how the patient will benefit from medical care.
“Patient preferences” asks the method to assess “Is the patient’s right to choose
being respected to the extent possible in ethics and law” (Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade
2002,12). “Quality o f life”, asks to further explore the practicality of medical
intervention in terms o f short-and-long-term. Under the heading o f “contextual features”,
the method asks for consideration o f external factors that may affect the clinical decision,
including law, resource availability, and conflicts of interest.
Although providing a formulaic consideration of the relevant facts affecting the
clinical encounter, a mechanism for ordering the importance of these facts is not present
in the method. Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade, “The authors believe that clinicians need
a straightforward method o f sorting out the pertinent facts and values of any case into an
orderly pattern that facilitates the discussion and resolution of ethical problems” (Jonsen,
Siegler, and Winslade 2002, 2). However, the method itself does not present a way to
rank the importance o f its findings. The difference here is that assessing the relevant
facts does not inform how to resolve the issues. But the authors o f the four-topic
approach believe that a systematic way o f listing the ethical issues affecting care will help
guide the discussion; “good ethical judgment consists in appreciating how ethical
principles should be interpreted in the actual situation under consideration” (Jonsen,
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Siegler, and Winslade 2002, 3). Certainly assessing the relevant issues is an important
and necessary first step. But how is the physician to make a decision based on the facts?
This is the critical point where a physician’s knowledge and skill will no longer inform
his decision; here he must make a decision more in accord with the art of healing than
with the science o f medicine.
Tarasoff Case: Psychiatric Confidentiality
Consider the four topic method and its application to the Tarasoff case'*, an actual
case where the central issue is whether or not to breach confidentiality. Ethical decisions
in medicine are not always limited to questions about whether or not to employ medical
treatment. Sometimes, however, actions in accord with the patient’s health are not a
matter for medicine, but a matter of law. Physicians have a certain legal status and
enforceable power in determining competency of other persons. Physicians are cloaked
in certain legal obligations in certain cases. As we will see in this case, obligations to the
patient and obligations to society can often come into conflict, and the physician must
rely on sound judgment in determining a course of action.
Prosenjit Poddar was a voluntary outpatient receiving psychological therapy at
Cowell Memorial Hospital, affiliated with the University of California at Berkeley.
During a regular treatment session in August, Poddar informed Dr. Lawrence Moore, his
therapist that he was going to kill an unnamed girl, readily identifiable as Tatiana
Tarasoff, when she returned home from spending the summer in Brazil. Moore, with the
concurrence o f Dr. Gold, who had initially examined Poddar, and Dr. Yandell, assistant
to the director of the department of psychiatry, decided that Poddar should be committed
This case example is extrapolated from Tarasoff v. Regents o f the University o f California, 17 Cal.3d 425
(1976); 131 California Reporter 14 (July 1, 1976). This case was cited in Principles o f Biomedical Ethics:
Fifth Edition by T. L. Beauchamp, Ph.D. et al.
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to a mental hospital for observation. Dr. Moore first orally notified campus police that he
would request commitment. Later, Moore sent a letter to the Campus Police chief
requesting assistance in securing Poddar for involuntary confinement.
Two officers took Poddar into custody, but, satisfied that he was rational, released
him with the promise that he stay away from Tatiana. Dr. Powelson, director of the
department of psychiatry and Dr. Moore’s supervisor, then requested the return of
Moore’s letter, and ordered that all documentation relating to the request for seventy-two
hour confinement be destroyed.
Poddar persuaded Tatiana’s brother to share an apartment with him near Tatiana’s
residence. Shortly after Tatiana’s return from Brazil, in October, Poddar went to her
residence and murdered Tatiana.
This case requires the physicians to weigh maintenance of patient confidentiality
against the protection of a third person from violence. Deontological internal morality
would suggest that the possibility of the effect on a third person of the patient’s action is
irrelevant to the process of treating and healing the patient. Considering Kant, the
physician’s duty is to maintain confidentiality. Confidentiality is essential to a
therapeutic relationship so it could be said that maintaining confidentiality is a Kantian
maxim as it should be maintained in all clinical cases everywhere. To deny this as a duty
to uphold would require that we consider the consequences of violating the
confidentiality, namely the harm to the third person. Such consequentialist contemplation
removes the praxis as deontological and brings it toward Mill utilitarianism. For
deontology to work in this case, the duty would have to be defined in favor of society
over the patient. If this were the case, the maxim would lie with benefiting society over
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the patient. But this is not the case, confidentiality for the individual patient remains the
duty and therefore, deontological conventional morality would not allow breaching
patient confidentiality despite the consequences.
It is reasonable that the murdering of another person would have negative effects
on Poddar’s mental health. If the physician does not stop Poddar from committing the
murder is he allowing harm to occur? Although the physician is not inflicting the harm,
he could prevent it by confining the patient. But the physician cannot do this without
violating his duty to confidentiality. So it would have to be the case that if a physician
foresees his patient engaging in conduct detrimental to his health he should do something
about it. The physician cannot forcibly stop a patient fi-om engaging in conduct
detrimental to his own health without violating autonomy. In this case using internal
morality in a deontological conventional sense, the physician cannot consider the
consequences o f Poddar’s actions as far as justifying violating the patient’s autonomy or
confidentiality. What the physician is resigned to do, then, is to fully address the
underlying causes for Poddar’s desire to kill Tarasoff and attempt to convince Poddar of
the profound effect murdering another person will have on his own health.
What is more important is why this patient has this desire to harm someone else,
and getting to the impetus o f this desire should be the sole concern o f the physician.
However, it seems untenable that a person who has credible knowledge that another
person may be harmed should ignore that information and not act on it as a member of a
civil society. But this is a physician-patient relationship, and to appeal to obligations to
society or third parties invites an external morality. Even if the intrusion o f external
values is found to be morally sound, the decision then goes to whether or not the therapist
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is justified in violating the internal obligation to his patient in lieu of compliance with an
external duty.
Poddar was a voluntary patient o f this therapist and therefore waived none of his
rights to confidentiality. Trust and full disclosure in a psychiatric case are more essential
than in other forms of physician-patient relationships for the simple reason that the
psychiatrist’s ability to determine state of mind is more subjective than other medical
disciplines that can rely more on empirical testing. What constitutes a physician-patient
relationship is the use of medical knowledge or skill to benefit the patient with the
patient’s consent. A psychiatrist is a physician, and Poddar is a voluntary patient in this
case.
Applying the four topic method to this case would yield the following relevant
facts. First, assessing the medical indications yields little information regarding the
nature o f the condition or the treatment. The extent of the effect of this mental health
condition is for the therapist to determine. The medical indication in this case is not so
much about further diagnosis, but what measures available to medicine should be used in
this case. One o f those powers of medicine is the ability to involuntarily confine a patient
to a mental hospital for a limited amount of time. Commitment to a mental hospital is
chiefly for the patient’s benefit, but it is reasoned that when a patient poses a threat to
others, confinement is also justified. Therefore, the clinical question here is whether or
not to invoke that power in this case. The therapist here felt that Poddar’s intent was at
least credible or he would not have had grounds for ordering involuntary confinement.
Secondly, under the patient preference heading of the four topics method,
competency o f the patient is considered. It is important to assess the competency of the
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patient in order to determine whether he is able to make decisions in accord with his own
best interests, and, whether or not this patient can or will comply with whatever treatment
is prescribed. In this case, again, the therapist feels that Poddar’s threat is credible, and
initiates the necessary steps to prevent harm to others. However, Dr. Moore’s attempts at
confinement are thwarted by the officers who determine Poddar to be rational, and Dr.
Moore’s superior, who does not support Dr. Moore’s decision. However, do these
external influences change Dr. Moore’s assessment? The case suggests that they do not,
but Dr. Moore does not aggressively pursue confinement, indicating that he is not
confident in his assessment of the patient, despite concurrence of two other colleagues
familiar with the case.
Third, quality o f life in the four topic method discusses what mental, physical, or
social deficits the patient may suffer without treatment. In this case, converting the
patient fiom out-patient to an in-patient would need to have clinical benefit for the patient
in both treating his underlying condition, and preventing further harm. This assumes that
committing murder would have negative effects on this patient’s mental health. If this is
the case then confinement would be justified. However, it could be the case that for the
patient, murdering Tarasoff could be cathartic and restore Poddar to good mental health.
This is an untenable moral position because one’s sanity is not worth another’s death
from an external normative value perspective. However, internal morality focuses on the
activity to treat the individual patient while rejecting or limiting external moral
influences. This example illustrates the danger of blindly following certain moral rules in
the name of duty without the capacity to accept circumstances that would justify breaking
the rule.
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Finally, a contextual feature of the four topic method incorporates contemplation
of the relevant external factors affecting the clinical relationship. It is at this point in the
four topic approach where relevant laws and larger obligations would be considered. At
this point in this case, a number o f external forces are at work; including reluctance of the
police to assist and confine the patient. Dr. Moore’s superior overriding his confinement
decision, the patient’s unwillingness to cooperate by voluntarily committing himself; and
the duty to protect the patient’s confidentiality. O f critical consideration here is to what
extent the physician obligated to the potential victim. What is the physician’s obligation
to society? The four box method invites these questions, but relies on the clinician and
whomever he consults to weigh the assessed facts.
This case serves as a good example of the failure of the four topic method to
resolve ethical issues. This case is a true clinical case, and assessing the relevant factors
in the four topic method does not help the therapist resolve the ethical issue (whether or
not to breach confidentiality). Knowledge of the medical indications, patient preferences,
patient’s quality of life, and the contextual features merely serves as a systematic way to
list the relevant particulars, but gives little guidance on how the clinician should proceed
after listing these particulars.
From a conventional perspective, the duty at question here is whether or not to
violate the patient’s right to confidentiality. Confidentiality is essential to preserve trust
in a therapeutic relationship, especially in psychiatry. Violating confidentiality may
destroy necessary therapeutic trust.
The Tarasoff case resulted in litigation where the family of the victim, Tatiana
Tarasoff, sued the therapist and the University of California Board of Regents for
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negligence in not meeting their duty to protect the public from violent assaults. The case
wound up before the California Supreme Court which held the therapist negligent in
failing to execute his proper duty to protect Tatiana.
In their defense the respondents argued that to breach Poddar’s confidentiality
would have violated the Code of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association.
The majority of the court rejected this argument, asserting that the determination to
maintain confidentiality must be weighed against the general public interest. In this case
the general public interest is to be reasonably free from assault, especially assault that
could be prevented. Further, the majority stated, “Weighing the uncertain and conjectural
character of the alleged damage done the patient by such a warning against the peril to
the victim’s life, we conclude that professional inaccuracy in predicting violence cannot
negate the therapist’s duty to protect the threatened victim” (Beauchamp and Childress
2001a, 417). The defendants also argued that they could not be certain that Poddar’s
threat was credible. However, the court ruled that “professional inaccuracy” does not
relieve them of an obligation to the wider public.
By this decision, the courts are establishing the precedent that in cases such as
these, the clinician has a legal obligation to protect the public or the intended victims
even if doing so undermines a sacred trust of the patient-physician relationship. Further,
the court finds that therapists have an obligation to society. Here the court is imposing
societal norms upon the clinician.
If person X learns that person Y is intending to kill person Z, person X, in the
court’s opinion, has an obligation to do something to protect person Z as part of being a
member of civil society. However, interpersonal communications are not privileged, but
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physician patient relations are. Trust and confidentiality are critical, especially in a
psychiatric case. The psychiatrist, though, came about Poddar’s threat through their
professional relationship, so the rules of the professional relationship apply. The
physicians defended not breaching confidentiality in this case, but the court held that the
therapist had a supererogatory obligation to the public over the patient.
The dissenting opinion of the court supported conventional morality in the
Tarasoff case. The minority supported the absolute importance of maintaining
confidentiality - especially in psychiatric relationships - despite the consequences. This
conclusion could also be considered deontological: the duty is to the confidentiality as it
is fundamental to the success of the healing relationship. Despite the consequences as
evidenced in the Tarasoff case, the minority still held that confidentiality is absolute in
the clinical relationship. “Given the importance of confidentiality to the practice of
psychiatry, it becomes clear the duty to warn imposed by the majority will cripple the use
and effectiveness of psychiatry” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001a, 418).
Additionally, the dissenting opinion raised the critical concern that violence
would increase because those who have violent thoughts will not express them because
the instances of confinement will go up out of abundance of caution by the clinician.
“Many people, potentially violent - yet susceptible to treatment - will be deterred from
seeking it; those seeking it will be inhibited from making revelations necessary to
effective treatment” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001a, 418). The minority opines that
the bulk of violent threats expressed to therapists are not credible, but this valuation of
the threat is based on the subjective experience of the therapist.
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Summing up Conventional Morality
Principles and values are going to apply to any clinical relationship. In
conventional morality the principles are accepted and following the principles supersedes
the ends the rules exist to meet. The rationality behind the principles winds up not being
of primary concern for the clinician; rather, the application of the principles in particular
cases results from the conventional moral praxis.
We saw in the case of the proscription of abortion that the external principle for
Catholic healthcare directly informed the ultimate treatment decision. Deliberation on
how to best treat the patient was confined by the rules binding on the facility, physician,
and patient. Such contemplation excluded other possibilities that may have been more in
accord with preserving health for the mother. If it were the case that the mother would
have suffered less by having an abortion instead o f induced labor, then the decision to
induce departed from the principle of alleviating suffering and restoring health.
In the Tarasoff case, we saw the clinicians respect and protect confidentiality
despite the bad outcome for a third person. Not considering the consequences of
violating confidentiality lies squarely with a conventional morality in accord with
confidentiality. Additionally, the fidelity to the patient would have been breached if the
confidentiality were violated for the sake of an external person, not party to the
relationship, and not a patient. However, the courts concluded that this case constituted a
situation providing justification for breaching the relevant ethical principles. In doing so,
the court imposed an external morality, whereby the physicians have a duty to other
potentially affected persons. The court’s action in this case constituted a departure from
conventional morality and an introduction to reflective morality.
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In contrast to conventional morality we consider reflective morality. Reflective
morality is a moral praxis whereby the basic values of the clinical relationship are
considered, but their application to particular cases is different. In the next chapter we
will evaluate how reflective morality differs and how reflective moral praxis may have
resolved these cases differently.
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CHAPTER4

REFLECTIVE MORALITY IN CLINICAL MEDICINE
In the previous chapter we discussed conventional morality and how it is used to
deliberate towards clinical ends in medicine. Here we will focus on reflective morality
and how it uses both internal and external moral modalities in clinical decision making
differently from conventional morality. The goals of clinical medicine remain the same,
but evaluating conventional and reflective moral methods will elucidate how those goals
may be obtained.
Reflective Morality
Reflective morality in contrast with conventional morality is more concerned with
achieving certain goals while conventional morality is more concerned with adhering to
rules that when followed should achieve the same good end. “Reflective morality arises
when an individual begins to reflect on what principles will govern his or her actions,
particularly when those actions involve the rights and interests of other persons (or other
sentient beings) or the integrity o f the agent” (Callahan 1988, 10). As Callahan sees it,
the first order of business is to identify what principles apply to the activity. Secondly, a
moral agent would then assess different options consistent with adhering to the relevant
principles o f an activity considering the particular circumstances of the case. Principles
considered relevant to the case at hand would be those consistent with the aim or telos of
the activity. In this sense reflective morality is teleological.
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Teleological thinking informs actions in accord with desirable goods or ends, the
telos. Callahan opines, “In practice, the temptation is often to function teleologically,
that is, to attempt to produce good results without considering seriously enough what
moral values might be sacrificed in the process” (Callahan 1988, 19). Callahan here
elucidates the notion that teleological reasoning is consequentialist. A consequentialist
theory stands in strong contrast to a deontological theory which directs the moral agents
reasoning toward following the principles for the principles’ sake despite the
consequences.
For example, a physician may consider his actions in accord with the principles of
good professional conduct when dealing with conflicts among different values.
Consider the importance of truth telling in the clinical setting Wallace writes.
One has a fuller or lesser knowledge and understanding of truth-telling as a
practical consideration depending upon the extent of one’s understanding of the
importance o f truth in various areas of life, why it is important, and how it is to be
compared in importance with other considerations that pertain in these areas”
(Wallace 1996,20-21).
Here Wallace asserts that mere knowing that truth-telling is important and should be done
is insufficient in determining whether or not one should tell the truth. To take a
deontological approach to truth - telling rejects that other values may usurp the need to
tell the truth in the case at hand. But if one understands the purpose of truth-telling, one
is better equipped to meet that purpose.
This is an example to prove the point that mere knowledge of the goods is
insufficient for working toward them. There must be many different ways of resolving
moral conundrums outside o f strict adherence to the rules. In medicine, for example,
there are instances where full disclosure of the truth would have a deleterious effect on
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the patient, so much so that sound clinical judgment would justify not telling the whole
truth. These sorts o f novel cases are what trap the deontologist. If a physician believes in
telling the whole truth all of the time and in one case the patient is harmed by the truth,
then the physician has met his duty to the rule, but failed to achieve the overriding good
aim of his clinical practice.
Reflective morality vets relevant values applicable to the decision at hand, and
seeks to meet the good aim o f the activity. In this praxis, full understanding of the
relevant technical matters is o f primary importance. In medicine, what is this patient’s
condition of health and what treatments are available? Then, after the physician has
assessed all reasonable technical features of the case, normative values are considered in
the deliberative process. The normative values would include what have previously been
established as the values applicable to healthcare and physicians; autonomy, beneficence,
nomaleficence, justice, privacy, confidentiality, veracity, and fidelity. In addition to
these “core” values, whatever particular normative values are of concern to the physician,
patient, or external sources, will be given consideration.
Whenever a clinical relationship exists, the core values are present. However,
reflective morality is relativistic and value pluralistic, inviting both the physician and the
patient to consider whatever particular values each o f them brings to the clinical
encounter. Value pluralism inherent in the reflective moral praxis does not exclude the
core values. Rather, it provides for varying degrees of weight o f each value and invites
valid external concerns into the clinical decision making process. Whatever is important
to the patient and the physician in the case at hand is fair game in reflective morality.
This praxis invites more values into play.
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The ultimate end of a moral praxis is a decision to act or not act. From a reflective
standpoint the desired end and the action towards that end are coherently justified.
Coherence, in this sense, is argued to stem from a form of reflective equilibrium^, where
balance among prior “considered [moral] judgments” is achieved. Considered judgments
are “the moral convictions in which we have the highest confidence and believe to have
the lowest level of bias” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001a, 398). These considered
judgments would be our current state of beliefs about what one should morally do in a
case based on reasoned or historical experience with the situation.
Conundrums appear in reflective equilibrium. “Whenever some feature in a moral
theory that we hold conflicts with one or more of our considered judgments, we must
modify one or the other in order to achieve equilibrium” (Beauchamp and Childress
2001a, 398). This is the essence of the reflective moral praxis: to apply prior beliefs to
novel cases. It is often the case that different actions will pit certain beliefs against
others, and what is required is to justify treating one belief differently from the other.
This coherence approach may help limit excessive pluralism, except that in
practice not all considered judgments m aybe considered in full force each time. What
constitutes a considered judgment remains non-universal and pluralistic. Our considered
judgments constitute the core values of healthcare: autonomy, beneficence,
nomaleficence, justice, privacy, confidentiality, veracity, and fidelity. The challenge in
reflective equilibrium is achieving balance among each of the valid prior moral
commitments.

' Beauchamp credits the term “reflective equilibrium” to John Rawls.
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Physician’s ad Jehovah’s Witness
It could be the case that the physician is a Jehovah’s Witness and does not believe
in blood transfusions for himself and will not order or perform them in his practice of
medicine. Although he is a competent physician, fully aware of the medical conditions
warranting treatment with a blood transfusion, he may interpret the use of blood
transfiisions as a malicious act devastating to the patient’s soul, constituting malfeasance.
The physician has limited his own practice of medicine based on his personal values. A
patient would need to be aware of this if the patient is not a Jehovah’s Witness and does
not accept the same values. This notion illustrates how a physician and a patient may be
moral strangers, which may affect the clinical relationship.
Whether or not the physician and the patient are moral strangers versus moral
friends will have an effect on the clinical encounter. In the above example, the physician
is interpreting the principle of nomaleficence as a proscription of transfusing blood.
However, his proscription against blood transfusions places his duty to veracity and
fidelity at odds. If the patient is also a Jehovah’s Witness (moral friend), then he will
understand the physician’s stance and accept it. However, if the patient is not a
Jehovah’s Witness (moral stranger), then he should be made aware of the physician’s
moral position. If the physician failed to notify his patient of his beliefs, then the
physician would be failing in veracity, fidelity, and autonomy.^

* There is no duty to inform a patient o f a physician’s religious belief. However, if those beliefs limit the
use o f otherwise valid and accepted medical treatments that the patient may not object to using, then the
physician is obligated to inform the patient that he is unwilling to do certain procedures. This would hold
true if the physician were Catholic or held any religious beliefs that would limit access to medical care o f
his patient. The most pressing issue is whether or not a physician would remain objective in exploring
diagnostic and treatment options based on his personal beliefs despite a personal proscription against them.
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However, the physician retains autonomy in practicing medicine in a manner
consistent with his own personal values. Forcing a physician to perform procedures
contrary to his personal beliefs is an unfair restriction on the physician’s judgment of
good practice. However, if this physician worked in a trauma center where blood
transfusions are routine, it would be morally impermissible for him to not order them
when needed because the patient may not be in a position to advocate for his own care.
Reflective morality will incorporate pertinent values from both the physician and
the patient. If it is the case that a physician is unwilling to engage in certain treatments
on moral grounds, this should be accommodated for the physician retains a degree of
autonomy in his practice. A physician’s autonomy is important in order to secure the
most objective diagnosis and treatment plan from the physician. It is not fair to say that a
physician should violate his own moral code just because he is a physician. To suggest
such would require that the core values of the clinical encounter have such moral force as
to disqualify an otherwise technically competent physician from the profession because
he or she will not perform or order certain procedures. But such accommodation of the
physician’s beliefs challenges external notions of what can be expected from the clinical
relationship. A patient may validly expect that a physician will use all the tools of
medicine to help heal the patient. But if a physician does not adhere to this external
expectation, is he less of a physician?
Additionally, the patient may impose moral values on the internal activity of
medicine that force the physician into creative alternative treatments. If a patient is a
Jehovah’s Witness and refuses blood transfusions, the physician may have to work harder
to restore health to the patient. Further, if the patient were going into surgery and refused
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a blood transfusion should one become necessary, the surgeon would be incurring
additional legal liability should anything go wrong. In these cases it would be customary
for a physician to secure additional liability waivers should complications not be treated
by a necessary blood transfusion.
Medical Licensing: Monopoly on Medical Practice
Physicians hold a state sanctioned monopoly over the practice of medicine
through medical licensing. The common mission of state medical boards is to protect the
public at large by ensuring that only licensed physicians practice medicine and that those
licensed meet minimum competency standards. The state will actively restrict those not
meeting these standards from practicing medicine as such practice is harmful to the
public.
Through each state’s “Medical Practice Act” or similar chapter o f state law, the
state outlines what constitutes the practice of medicine and the duty and obligations of
physicians practicing under the licensing authority. The compelling state interest for
state intervention in medical licensing is to provide both positive and negative standards
for medical practice. Positive standards would describe what a physician can and is
obligated to do as holder of a medical license. Negative standards would outline
physician conduct that would be grounds for sanctioning a licensee.
Most medical practice acts do not require that doctors perform or offer certain
treatments. The purpose of licensing physicians is to ensure that the public has access to
competent doctors, not particular treatments. In Nevada, chapter 453A of the Nevada
Revised Statutes (NRS) allows for licensed physicians to prescribe marijuana for
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treatment of certain chronic medical conditions^. Nevada’s medical licensing chapters,
630 and 633 of the NRS state that a physician cannot be disciplined for prescribing
medical marijuana under the provisions of chapter 453A*. This is an example of ensuring
that the public has access to a certain treatment but does not require the physician to
provide the treatment. Considering these two chapters of law, 453A provides for medical
marijuana and authorizes only a licensed physician to write the prescription. Chapter 630
and 633 insulate a licensed physician from discipline for writing for medical marijuana,
but does not require a licensee to do so.
A physician’s election not to participate in a treatment must be respected to
protect the physician’s autonomy. If a physician is required to perform certain
procedures by law, the state is stripping a level of autonomous professional judgment
from the physician. The state must balance this need for professional autonomy against
ensuring that patients seeking or requiring certain treatments, although controversial, may
get them if it will work to the patient’s best interest.
In controversial cases such as the use of medical marijuana, abortions, treatment
of intractable pain, and administering lethal injections to condemned prisoners, the state

’’ NRS 453A.030 “Attending physician” defined. “Attending physician” means a physician who:
1. Is licensed to practice:
(a) Medicine pursuant to the provisions o f chanter 630 o f NRS; or
(b) Osteopathic medicine pursuant to the provisions o f chapter 633 o f NRS; and
2. Has responsibility for the care and treatment o f a person diagnosed with a chronic or debilitating
medical condition.
(Added to NRS by 2001. 3054: A 2003. 1180. 14301
NRS 453A.120 “M edical use o f marijuana” defined. “Medical use o f marijuana” means:
1. The possession, delivery, production or use o f marijuana;
2. The possession, delivery or use o f paraphernalia used to administer marijuana; or
3. Any combination o f the acts described in subsections 1 and 2,
*"* as necessaiy for the exclusive benefit o f a person to mitigate the symptoms or effects o f his chronic or
debilitating medical condition.
(Added to NRS by 2001. 30551
* Both NRS 630.3066 and NRS 633.521 respectively
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does not require the physician to provide certain procedures. Instead the state
accommodates certain practices within certain guidelines. The law requires licensees to
adhere to good medical practice, but does not require the physician to perform
controversial procedures, accommodating some autonomy for the healthcare professional.
If a state began requiring doctors to perform abortions or administer lethal injections, the
state would essentially begin practicing medicine, depriving physicians of independent
judgment. Respective medical practice acts constitute conventions required to hold
medical licenses. Most medical practice acts have vague definitions of malpractice or
professional misconduct to allow for more discretion of the licensee in his or her practice
as well as to allow the adjudicating board more discretion in enforcing standards of
practice. The regulatory scheme for medical licensing is a good example of a reflective
moral praxis as medical boards evaluate individual cases of physician conduct much in
the same way as courts apply general laws to specific cases.
Internal and External Morality in Reflective Morality
Reflective morality incorporates internal and external morality in different ways.
The essentialist-intemalists such as Pellegrino believe that the good of medicine, health,
and the activity towards it exist outside physician-patient preferences. “The moral
authority o f an internal morality of medicine is independent of whether or not physicians
accept or reject it. ...the authority arises from an objective order of morality that
transcends the self-defined goals of a profession” (Pellegrino 2001, 564-565). Here,
Pellegrino rejects the validity of historical professionalism whereby physicians through
precedent and history articulate the realm of medical practice. Instead, Pellegrino opines
that the “order of morality” is objective, implying that it exists outside both the physician
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and the patient, but must be of concern to both the physician and the patient during the
clinical encounter. Pellegrino would suggest that internal morality is all that is necessary
as the physician and the patient strive for the good. The parties to the internal morality
are the physician and the patient, and the good is achieved through their work. The main
point Pellegrino wants to make is that the good of health itself exists beyond the practice.
In other words, the good of health exists whether or not the physician or patient is aware
o f it; therefore the practice of healing or working towards this good is a higher order
practice transcendent of human influence. In this sense, health exists as a universal good
that the patient and the physician are working toward they cannot create nor can they
destroy it. This point, in Pellegrino’s view, is essential to the practice of medicine, and
holding this position would favor the internal morality approach over others because it is
concerned with higher order goods that cannot be made, changed, or destroyed.
Pellegrino rejects notions that medical ethics should be used to accommodate
changes in external social mores. “An ethics thus conceived is an ethic external to
medicine. It denies that there is something essentially in the nature of medicine as a kind
of human activity which determines its ends and its ethics internally” (Pellegrino 2001,
560). Pellegrino works to identify something essential to clinical medicine that is beyond
the physician and the patient. By doing so he invokes classical arguments from Aristotle
and Plato asserting the teleological end of medicine as the ultimate ruling principle. By
doing this he invites ancient philosophical arguments on how one may work toward the
good.
In Pellegrino’s view, the character of the physician plays a central role in
accessing knowledge of the good and working toward it. “The untrustworthy
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professional could exploit the patient’s vulnerability for personal power, profit, or
prestige. In each case, the character of the professional is the final safeguard. In each
case, the end of professional activity is the good of the person in need of help”
(Pellegrino 2001, 573). Pellegrino asserts the potential harm when a physician places
self-interest over that of the patient. But Pellegrino offers only the character of the
physician as a safeguard against this harm. This is a major problem because all the cards
are in the physician’s deck. It is the patient who is seeking health as he writes; the
physician is intended to help the patient seek that end.
We can accept Pellegrino’s theory that the practice of medicine is good work
toward a good end in the Aristotelian sense. But we cannot build a paradigm for good
clinical practice on that notion alone. In the first case, health is relative in each person
who experiences it. Health is universal in that it is experienced to some degree in every
person, but to some degree is individualistically relative. Therefore, it is difficult to
develop a coherent ethical theory around such a broad and abstract notion. To restate the
good end as “health relative to this patient” does not remedy the problem because we are
still at a loss for how to act towards this good.
Additionally, knowledge of what health is as a virtue and as a homeostatic state in
the human body remains insufficient for informing actions toward the good. The ability
to work toward health will be limited by facts, cultural expectations, and different
weighing of the values by the patient (Beauchamp and Childress 2001a, 398). It is too
simply stated that the physician should be concerned only with working toward the good
of health.

66

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

It is the purpose of the healing arts to attain the good of health, but to limit
attaining this good to only an internal moral praxis is to exclude important elements of
the activity toward the good. Pellegrino agrees with these core values o f healthcare:
autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. He adds four areas of focus for the
physician in attaining the good: the medical good, the patient’s perception of the good,
the good for humans, and the spiritual good. These four features rest exclusively in the
internal morality o f medicine whereby only the physician and the patient are involved in
making decisions in these areas toward the good of health. Addressing these four areas
and adhering to the four general principles for healthcare prove impossible in a pure
internal moral sense.
Through these four features Pellegrino might be trying to give us a formula for
assessing the values relevant to the clinical encounter. Using this formula we would then
know what the issues are, but we would not know how to resolve them. Although he
tries to argue that an internal morality is properly informed when it considers individual
consequences within each of these four areas, in practice each area invites internal moral
deliberation considering external values as instructive to the internal moral discussion.
Additionally, considering actions under his four principles of internal morality inherently
has external effects to the degree where the effect of the internal praxis would dissuade
action because of the external consequences.
Achieving equilibrium among Pellegrino’s four features is not possible using a
purely internal moral praxis. Internal morality in medicine limits the scope of the
deliberation to the physician and the patient. The physician and the patient bring the
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relevant values applicable to the clinical encounter. These values are inherently external
derived from both the patient’s and physician’s expectations and experiences.
To simultaneously consider the medical good, patient’s perception of the good,
good for humans, and the spiritual good requires consideration of the consequences of
any particular act. These consequences will affect others external to the clinical
relationship. And to consider these consequences biases the internal moral praxis toward
teleology over deontology which is Pellegrino’s aim. However, to achieve balance
among his four features requires that both the physician and the patient consider the
influences and effects o f whatever actions are taken based on the clinical encounter. This
is paradoxical because to consider the consequences of an act on humans generally and
the good o f medicine, for example, implies that the actions in this particular set of
circumstances will have some effect on others. If a clinical decision is arrived at from
considering the decisions effect on others, then it cannot be the case that what is purely in
the best interests of this patient under these particular circumstances is purely internal.
Of Pellegrino’s four features none can exist in isolation from external factors.
Contemplating the medical good requires considering what technical features of medical
practice can do for this patient in terms of treatment options. However, it also has
consequences, for if the powers of medicine are abused or, in Pellegrino’s sense, not used
toward the expressed aim o f attaining health, then what medicine is and what it means to
society change. A good example is the abuse of medical knowledge or skill in
administering lethal injections. Whether the intent is to execute a condemned prisoner or
to assist a patient in desired suicide, both would constitute an act contrary to the medical
good because the aim is not to restore health.
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Reflecting on Proscribed Abortion
Reconsidering the cases outlined in the preceding chapter, let us articulate how
reflective morality may have handled the cases differently. Regarding the Catholic
Church’s proscription against abortion a reflective moral praxis would have considered
the relevant medical indications differently.
First, in either reflective or conventional morality the medical indications for the
case must be fully addressed. The only medical concern that should be weighed more
heavily under the reflective moral praxis is whether or not the mother suffered more from
the premature delivery than she would have had she had an abortion. Whether or not an
abortion would have been easier on the mother’s failing health is important in
considering the best benefit for the patient. However, because of the ERD treatment
options were limited in that because of the directive abortion was not an option. So if the
mother would have suffered less undergoing an abortion, then following the rule
prohibiting abortion placed the mother in more risk. The treatment options were limited
by conventional morality whereby they would not be so limited under reflective morality.
This exemplifies how a reflective morality may consider the medical indications and
treatment options of the patient differently. Additionally, this case illustrates how the full
effect of the medical condition and possible treatments is more thoroughly considered in
reflective morality.
If it was the patient’s desire to have an abortion in lieu of induced premature
labor, this would be an important piece of information affecting how this patient is
treated. If it was the case that the patient preferred the abortion, and this valid treatment
option was not offered to her or even considered because of the institutional proscription
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against that treatment option, then the physician failed in both veracity and fidelity by not
informing the patient that a potentially safer treatment option was available to her even
though the physician and the hospital were unwilling to perform the procedure. Without
maintaining veracity it is difficult to accept that the patient’s decision to undergo a certain
course o f treatment is fully informed and in accord vrith the patient’s best interests.
The important distinction here is that under a reflective moral praxis it is more
likely that the patient would have full access to all the available treatment options. In this
case, instead of even considering an abortion, the hospital and the physician had to work
around the proscription.
The patient’s personal moral position on abortion is irrelevant under conventional
morality. It seems untenable that the patient’s moral position concerning certain
treatment options could ever be irrelevant. “The patient wants to, and should, be able to
rest assured that the doctor or nurse only looks at what is best for the patient. One
should, for example, not have to worry about whether the doctor first and foremost will
subordinate herself to a politically controlled or ‘correct’ [sic] health care” (Nordin 1999,
118). Under conventional morality, this is what happens. The physician and the hospital
were more concerned with whether or not they would violate the ERDs than with what
may have been a better treatment option.
Further, this distinction highlights how reflective morality requires that veracity
and fidelity have been fully exercised by the physician as both are essential to obtaining
proper informed consent from the patient. Consent is essential to the notion of autonomy,
a right that caimot be rejected without substantial justification that the patient is not
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competent to make a decision in accord with prior considered judgments of well being^.
Additionally, if a physician engages in treatment of a patient without reasonable tacit or
explicit consent, the physician is committing battery against the patient. In most cases,
however, the patient may not understand his own rights in the clinical encounter with
regard to consent.
In the proscribed abortion scenario, the chief difference between conventional and
reflective moralities is whether or not a controversial treatment common in some parts of
medicine and strictly forbidden in others would be considered in the clinical encounter.
If the patient desired an abortion and was denied the option, and then veracity was not
met by the physician. The physician has a duty to inform the patient of all available
treatment options, even those the physician cannot or will not do. A simple example
includes that an internist or family practitioner must know the limits of medical
knowledge and when his patient needs to see a specialist.
Ultimately a reflective moral praxis in this case would have accommodated the
patient’s desire for an abortion if she so desired. Under reflection, the medical condition
is more fully explored and all treatment options are made available. In this case, the
medical condition could not have been fully explored because one major treatment option
was eliminated by an external value. Externality may validly affect the clinical
relationship, and this is why internal morality practiced in a conventional way will more

®Informed consent is a complex notion in medical ethics. The question surrounds how much information
the patient needs to make an informed decision. Additionally, can the patient understand the medical
information provided? It is um-easonable to expect a patient to understand specifically what will be done
during a surgical procedure or the precise biochemical mechanisms o f one medication over another. So, it
is accepted that the patient must be adequately informed in order to consent to treatment. A thorough
discussion o f informed consent cannot be undertaken here.

71

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

likely miss assessing the full moral picture. Consider the external values imposed on
physicians following the Tarasoff case.
Tarasoff Reconsidered Reflectively
In the Tarasoff case the chief concern was maintenance of confidentiality of
medical information obtained during a clinical encounter. The information at hand, if
considered credible, would have severe negative effects on a third party (i.e., her possible
murder). The physicians decided that maintaining confidentiality was more important
than the possible harm to the third party. The case resulted in litigation whereby the
Supreme Court of California ruled that the physicians in the case had an overriding duty
to the greater public, and that such greater duty constituted sound justification for the
breach of confidentiality.
The physician in the case and the dissenting opinion of the court in Tarasoff are
good examples of conventional morality in action. Both the physicians and the dissenting
justices felt that their duty was to confidentiality despite the potential consequences.
Such a conclusion is deontological whereby the duty to the principle supersedes the
possible effects o f the action. This decision is purely deontological because the rule of
confidentiality is sacred under these terms and such a position excludes any imaginable
circumstance where the rule should be broken.
How would reflective morality have considered the case differently? The court’s
ruling is a good example o f reflective morality. The court essentially ruled that the
physician has a greater duty to protect society from harm and that this duty supersedes
the physician’s duty to the patient. The physicians had reasonable belief that the patient’s
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threat was credible and because they had this knowledge had a supererogatory duty
beyond protecting the confidentiality of this patient under these circumstances.
A reflective moral praxis would take into account the effect of adhering to the
duty and its consequences. Generally conventional morality considers the application of
the rule over the end or purpose the rule exists to meet. This process o f considering when
a rule should not be fully complied with is inherently reflective, and a process that courts
often engage in. The decision making process courts routinely undergo is very similar to
what physicians are asked to do when making clinical judgments.
The role o f the judiciary in American democratic government is to determine the
intent o f the laws made by the legislative branch and executed by the executive branches
and how they are applied to particular cases at hand. The legislature cannot be expected
to make laws that are clearly relevant to each and every case; the medical profession
cannot promulgate a body of norms that are clearly relevant in all cases. In law and
medicine, novel cases will arise, and both judges and physicians must decide how the
rules apply to this particular case.
An example from law includes Ronald Dworkin’s discussion of the decision in
the nineteenth-century case of Riggs v. Palmer^^. In that case, a grandson murdered his
grandfather, and following his conviction, claimed the part of the estate the grandfather
left to this grandson vis-à-vis his will. At the time there was no law preventing a legatee
from inheriting after murdering the testator. This case advanced to the Supreme Court of
New York where one lone justice argued that to deny the legatee the right of inheritance,
which was clearly the intent of the grandfather as expressed through his will, would
constitute precedent that would invalidate the underlying intent of wills.
Riggs

V.

Palmer 22 N.E. 188 (1889) Court o f Appeals o f N ew York
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Despite clear law informing this particular case, the court relied upon an
underlying legal principle that a criminal should not profit from his crimes. Writing for
the court Justice Earl stated, “If there arise out of them [legal statutes] collaterally an
absurd consequences manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are with regard to
those collateral consequences void” (Johnson 1993, 119). In this case, the murderer
clearly would profit, and the court opined that it would not have been the intention of the
legislature to have the laws governing wills abused in this way. “In other words, judges
should understand and apply the law of wills independently of the rest of the law”
(Wallace 1996, 77-78). “This is an application of the general point that reasonableness in
following any norm is a matter of observing the norm in conjunction with other norms
that pertain in the pursuit of one or more activities” (Wallace 1996, 79). Wallace’s point
is that it is not desirable to consider laws in isolation, but to consider law making and law
abiding as an important social activity. Then consider the intended purposes of the
activity to make better moral decisions about how to engage in such an activity.
Each professional activity is part of a greater social activity. Each social activity
is experienced in a community and that community determines how the activity should
occur. “An account of the good is at once local and particular - partially defined by the
characteristics of the polis” (MacIntyre 1984, 148). MacIntyre discussed the common
history of each person in his family and community, and that each of these common
histories form the moral fabric of normative values. Further, a community could come
together to achieve a common moral project. For this to be successful all would have to
agree on what constitutes a virtue and a vice (MacIntyre 1984, 151).
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This illustration translates well into the work of physicians as their professional
practice constitutes a social activity with clear ends and means. Their practice involves
effect on their patients and on society as a whole. Good practice in this sense then
requires consideration of the larger consequences of a physician’s work. To this end
good practice would be enhanced when acts of the practice are considered in conjunction
with the higher purposes of the activity. For physicians, the higher purpose is the health
o f their patient. And like judges, physicians must understand the “laws” of medicine, and
identify how to best apply them in the case of their individual patient. To do so well
invites reflection on the ends and purposes of the rules more than the rules themselves.
In the Riggs case, if the court ruled in a conventional deontological fashion, then
the murderer would have received the inheritance. But to do so was a morally tenuous
position whereby reflection on the use of the practice, the use (or abuse) of the law,
would have negative effects and evidenced poor jurisprudence.
On the other hand, allowing judges to supplement the law seems to overstep the
role of the legislature. However, in this case, the court didn’t invent a baseless ruling;
rather it supported its conclusion not based on the absence of laws governing murdering
testators, but rather on the intention and purpose of the law governing wills. The intent of
wills is to ensure that one’s wishes are carried out after one has died. In order for the
court to honor the terms of the will, the court would need to be convinced that under the
circumstances, the grandfather would have still intended for his grandson to inherit part
of his estate. Additionally, if the court had been so tightly bound by the strict letter of the
law, “the law would be a stupid thing” (Wallace 1996,79 quoting H.L.A Hart from The
Concept o f Law 1961 Oxford University Press). Courts and doctors need to be able to
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think out of the box and not be too tightly bound by rules and principles, but instead be
free to make reasoned judgments in the best interest of the activity of their profession.
Conclusion on Reflective Morality
We want our doctors to think in terms of our own health first and foremost. We
do not like thinking that our doctors are even considering what effect the outside world
may have on our own personal health. We want our doctors to follow the rules, all of the
time. And all of those rules should point toward our individual health. This is essentially
what medicine should be about; this is why we have doctors. But this is not how the
system works in the real world and this is our system that we created.
Long ago are the days when doctors were just doctors and they could do
everything. Now medicine is highly specialized and very expensive. Medicine is as
complicated as our own society. We live in a culturally pluralistic society with only a
few common values necessary to maintain a civil state. Yet, when it comes to medicine,
there are fewer absolutes since there are different cultures.
If medicine’s end is health relative to the individual, then medicine must take into
account what constitutes health for any particular patient. It is hard to hold to absolute
values of medicine, but easier to hold to professional standards of practice that transcend
any professional. Medicine is a professional art and like any art its end is excellence in
practice. For medicine excellence is achieved through health realized by the patient. To
achieve this good end o f professional practice the practitioner must be free to consider
whatever factors make a difference in restoring or maintaining health for this patient.
Therefore a moral practice that is accommodating of a pluralistic culture will have more
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success in achieving the good end of health than a deontological conventional moral
practice.
Reflective morality in medicine allows for more values to be considered without
rejecting values altogether. We saw that reflective morality considers numerous values,
excluding only those not relevant to the good end of the practice. Conventional morality,
on the other hand, will exclude contemplation of certain values that may threaten
theoretical moral compliance with the principles of the practice and the goals it is trying
to meet. Reflective morality tries to restore balance or equilibrium in moral decision
making. This moral theory is more in line with the purpose of medicine and healing in
the first place, to restore balance and equilibrium to the body so it may realize health as
good.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION
Throughout this work we have identified six concepts woven through the web of
ethical decision making in clinical medicine. These concepts include; deontology,
teleology, internal and external morality, conventional and reflective morality. These
moral schemes employ eight notions of normative values in medicine including:
autonomy, beneficence, nomaleficence, justice, privacy, confidentiality, veracity, and
fidelity.
Ethical decisions in medicine are a matter of internal moral praxis. The physician
and the patient decide what is in the best interest of the patient as they strive toward the
good of health. This internal contemplation is influenced by external values informing
the internal decision making process by prescribing some values and proscribing others.
The product of internal moral decision making is achieved in part by contemplating
conventions or reflecting on the ends of the activity. In some cases, a clinical decision is
derived from a true conventional moral praxis, while others are purely reflective. In other
cases, however, the result of a decision could be said to come from a combination of both
conventional and reflective moralities. And this leads us to the ultimate challenge in
medical-ethical decision making: How best to act toward the good of health?
This thesis does not advocate that one moral scheme is better than another for the
following reasons. First, the author rejects that ethical naturalism exists. Knowledge of
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right and wrong does not present itself like scientific knowledge. Science is well
grounded by empirical evidence where the laws of science are discovered rather than
made. Perhaps it is the case that there are universal virtues and the knowledge of those
virtues comes about through reason. As Kant suggests, pure practical reason is how we
understand what the good is. The question lies in what we do with that knowledge once
we have attained it. But like science, ethics requires consensus among the learned to
accept conclusions as valid. Therefore, our understanding of virtues comes about through
an epistemic consensus informed by practice in working through moral conundrums.
Second, ethics is concerned with habit towards good activity. An individual
strives toward the goods and may employ learned counsel toward that end. Counselors
include moral friends, like-minded individuals with whom to share ethical concerns. In
instances where the concern is spiritual, legal, or medical, a person may consult a
professional concerned with the activity. Here is the omega point for the practice o f any
profession and, o f particular concern with this work, the practice of medicine. When a
person consults a physician that physician must have both theoretical wisdom of how to
directly advise or help the patient attain the good end of health and the practical wisdom
to deliberate well on the good use of his knowledge toward his patient’s realization of the
good as the patient desires.
Third, the author accepts a qualified liberal pluralistic notion o f good ethics. Each
person represents an individual moral agent with varying degrees of understanding of
what constitutes a good and how to work toward it. Each physician will have
individualized notions of good practice for his profession. Where the physician and the
patient meet may invite different concepts of what the good is and how to get there.
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However, excessive pluralism in its most pure form is problematic because it challenges
the notions o f some fundamental grounding principles. The qualification for excessive
pluralism is that there are or need to be some basic universal notions consistent with
activity toward health and the practice of medicine. Whether these notions exist in a
universal sense or are the result of considered prior judgments on the good is fodder for a
robust debate among ethicists.
Fourth, what matters most in our discussion is not whether or not normative
values in clinical medicine are in the form of virtue or universal principles but how we
achieve the good end o f health from the activity working towards it. Consensus on some
very basic ethical principles concerned with the practice of medicine is necessary if one
seeks to act well toward achieving a good end. Some knowledge o f the good is essential
before working toward it. But how each person achieves the good is relative as each
person’s state o f health varies. Therefore, a moral scheme most attuned with achieving
the good on a case-by-case basis must be able to include the notions o f the good but
apply them in a manner to promote equilibrium in the practical activity.
This leads us to conclude that a hybrid of conventional and reflective morality is
the better approach to clinical decision making. Grounding morality in basic ethical
principles while remaining open to their relative bearing on the clinical encounter is more
likely to result in excellent medical practice achieving the good of health for patients.
Strengths of Conventional Morality
The most attractive features of a conventional moral praxis are that it is well
rooted in normative principles laden with deontological duty to adhere to these principles.
The principles are presumed to be the result of reason and in accord with the good
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requiring no further critique. A dutiful physician will follow the rules accepting that to
do so will yield good work toward the good aim of his professional practice. Grounding
the practice in solid rules provides a good predicate for the practice of medicine by
members o f the profession and understanding of good professional practice from the
perspective o f lay society.
Theoretically this scheme should work well but requires a number of
presuppositions. First, the principles of practice must be so well attuned with the good
end of the practice that they are immune from critical reflection. Normative values for
physician practice stem from obligations to an internal morality for the activity of
practicing medicine and are categorized as essentialist, practical precondition, historicalprofessionalism, and evolutionary as outlined in the first chapter. Through these various
accounts, normative values have formed outlining what principles a physician should
adhere to in the internal moral praxis. Internal morality in a conventional praxis is aimed
at dutiful adherence to the principles. Thus this moral scheme is deontological and nonconsequentialist. This scheme prescribes and universalizes the ethical precepts for
medical practice.
Outlining the principles for physician conduct and considering those principles
uncritically standardizes the practice of medicine. Standardizing medical practice may
promote trust in the profession as a whole. It may also have the effect of promoting a
contractual nature to the physician-patient relationship where the patient expects the
physician to provide certain goods and services (Geller 2006, 82-85).
Physicians adhering to conventional morality are unfettered by accommodating
excessive value pluralism. The physician is focused on how to mold the activity of any
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clinical encounter into accord with the rules of the profession and the practice. The
contemplation for the physician under this moral scheme is how to fit the current state of
affairs encumbering this patient into the standard model for good ethical practice of the
healing art.
A conventional moral approach is more accessible to a physician because
contemplation in applying this scheme is similar to how physicians conduct
investigations into medical problems. Physicians are scientifically trained and approach
their patients in a pragmatic critical manner consistent with diagnosing disease. This
approach is well articulated by Ladd as he outlined the “problems approach” a physician
undertakes in evaluating a patient.
When a patient sees a physician the patient expresses feeling ill. The patient does
not know exactly why he feels ill but wants to feel well. The physician is now charged
with conducting an investigation into the patient’s symptoms to identify the source of the
patient’s ailment. The physician takes a history, performs an exam, may order
radiological and/or laboratory tests in an effort to accumulate evidence to use to make a
diagnosis. The physician then interprets this evidence to make an educated guess on a
diagnosis and will suggest treatment accordingly. If the treatment works, the patient feels
well and the physician has done his job.
In this example, though, the patient and the physician approach the same problem
in different ways. Both the patient and the physician are concerned with resolving the
patient’s ailment and restoring health. But the patient just knows that he feels sick, while
the physician wants to know why the patient feels sick. For example, the patient feels
pain in the right lower quadrant of his abdomen. The physician begins a systematic
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investigation o f possible sources for the pain. Here the physician is ruling out a number
of possible causes o f the abdominal pain: appendicitis, diverticulitis, irritable bowel
syndrome, Crohn’s disease, or any number of other ailments that may lead to this
patient’s feeling ill.
For Ladd, the physician and the patient are approaching the problem from
different perspectives. The physician is trying to solve the medical mystery causing the
patient’s pain and the patient just wants to feel better. Both are concerned with the
ailment and alleviating the pain, but from largely different perspectives. From this, Ladd
suggests that the investigation of the same set of circumstances is different warranting
different considerations o f the good of health. This dichotomy illustrates that both the
physician and the patient are operating from different value systems and therefore should
consider medical ethics differently (Ladd 1983,223).
This example shows that in practice the physician uses a programmatic inquiry
into resolving the medical mystery. He is trying to identify how this patient’s condition
is most similar to other conditions resulting in the same set of symptoms increasing the
probability that one diagnosis is correct over another. In other words, the physician is
trying to see how this case fits with other similar cases using a standard method of
inquiry. Such a method o f inquiry is ingrained in a physician’s training as the proper
approach to evaluating any patient. Since physicians are well trained in this
methodological approach to diagnosis and treatment and conventional morality mirrors
this process, physicians would be more likely to accept a conventional approach.
This point was illustrated in our discussion of the “Four Topics Method” where
there was a systematic way o f assessing the relevant particulars of any given case in an
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effort to resolve ethical conundrums. The authors of the “Four Topic Method” promoted
their method as accessible to physicians because of the way physicians are otherwise
trained to address problems.
But it is not necessarily the case that a method more accessible to physicians is a
better method for meeting the ends of the professional practice. It may be the case that
physicians need to think beyond their habit of medical inquiry to properly address ethical
issues in medicine.
Weaknesses of Conventional Morality
Conventional morality’s chief failure is its deontological bend. The praxis of
deciding how to comply with ethical principles places allegiance to the principle above
the aim o f the activity. Considering the principle of confidentiality, if a physician is more
concerned with the duty to preserve confidentiality, he may be closed to considering
situations where violating confidentiality is more in line with the greater purpose of
achieving the end. This point was well illustrated in the Tarasoff case where a murder
could have been prevented if the physician had not pedantically adhered to the notion of
confidentiality. In this case the duty to the principle outweighed the greater civic duty of
the physician to prevent harm to others.
Conventional morality does not handle ethical pluralism well. Some ethical
precepts are important, but with each patient any number of external or internal values
brought to the encounter by the patient may complicate an encounter with a strict
conventional physician.
Pellegrino and others lament the departure from an essentialist view for physician
conduct as physicians. Pellegrino asserts that since the aim of the physician’s practice is
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health the physician will know better how to attain health for his patient. Following this
notion eliminates the patient from expecting his physician from acting on the patient’s
moral preferences. It could be the case that the patient does not know what is necessary
for his own health and the physician should coach them toward activity in accord with the
good.
The presupposition invites medical paternalism which lays the moral
responsibility on the physician. To give the physician exalted moral agent status requires
an elemental trust of the physician’s moral judgment. Pellegrino asserts that physician
character traits lend themselves competent to make such moral deliberations.
It seems untenable to defer moral decision making as it pertains to medicine to
physicians alone, especially in light of the fact that it is the patient who desires the good
of health and the physician is there merely to help. Medicine has evolved into a more
contractual-commercial enterprise where patients dissatisfied with a physician’s advice or
unwillingness to perform certain procedures results in a patient finding another doctor
who will. This trend does not make the patient more right than the physician, but a
common ground must be met. This sort of shift in the relative importance of the
physician increases the notion of ethical pluralism.
Conventional morality does not accommodate ethical pluralism, limiting its
usefulness and universal application. Conventional morality is either too abstract or too
conservative to be helpful in resolving practical ethical problems in clinical medicine. If
the ultimate end is health and only health, this notion does not help us to determine how
to work toward that in novel cases. If the rules of physician conduct are deontological.
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then we cannot handle situations where acting in accord with the duties conflicts with
other moral principles.
Conventional morality relies on the unquestioned acceptance of the normative
values of medicine. These moral values have evolved over time. But how can
conventional morality advance to accommodate advances in medical science without
critical contemplation of the values? Theoretical wisdom advances and practical wisdom
follows. First, we must understand the theoretical then through practical wisdom
understand what the theoretical means and how to use it. Conventional morality does not
encourage advances in practical wisdom.
Strengths of Reflective Morality
Reflective morality focuses on fully assessing the case at hand and considering all
applicable ethical principles and preferences to the contemplated activity. Reflective
morality does not reject out of hand certain principles. The grounding central principles
of autonomy, beneficence, nomaleficence, and justice remain. The chief difference is
that reflective morality accommodates specifications accommodating breaching these
ethical principles when the consequences of such a breach are more in line with the
teleological end of the activity. More open consideration of normative values invites
more ethical pluralism, making this theory more applicable to more cases.
In contrast to conventional morality, reflective morality is more focused on the
ends of the activity over the duty to adhere to ethical principles. This theory is
consequentialist in nature as the full effect o f the action is considered when deliberating
toward the action. Consequentialism stands in contrast to deontology whereby the
consequences o f the act are irrelevant because such considerations would hinder acting in
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accord with duty, again considered to be unquestioned. As a consequentialist theory
focused more on achieving a good end o f the activity, reflective morality is also a
teleological theory.
Health as the relative state of optimal functioning for each individual invites each
individual to bring his own normative values to the clinical encounter. The act of
working towards health is the telos of the physician’s work. Essentialist-intemalists such
as Pellegrino argue that their theory is more in line with the good end of medicine {telos).
However, reflective morality holds the telos as central while deontological conventional
morality holds the norms central. Because of reflective moralities more broad
consideration o f any and all relevant principles to achieving the good end, this theory is
more in line with the ultimate good of medicine than deontological conventional
morality.
Through reflective morality, a physician is better able to accommodate his
patient’s ethical preferences or influences. This is ethical pluralism and each clinical
encounter is going to consider ethical principles differently.
In some cases spiritual influences of the patient will bear heavily on the clinical
encounter. For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses proscribe blood transfusions, so a
physician must honor that preference and work around it.
Reflective morality is definitively consequentialist as it centrally considers the
effect of the action on achievement of the good. This invites ethical pluralism as well as
numerous treatment options into the clinical encounter because everything is accessible
in reflective morality. The method for removing treatment options is based on whatever
relevant values apply to this particular case. Through deliberation the physician and the
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patient may achieve an ethical equilibrium among the various ethical principles
applicable to the clinical encounter.
Because reflective morality is far more pluralistic than conventional morality the
method for identifying specifications to ethical practices is paramount. Beauchamp’s
justified specification account works well in identifying which circumstances warrant
breaching ethical rules or principles.
As we saw in the Tarasoff case, reflective morality would have accepted the
conclusion that breaching Poddar’s confidentiality was in the best interests of the
community and the intended victim. This set of circumstances warrants a justified
specification to the confidentiality rule. Reflective morality challenges the moral agents
to analyze the consequences of their actions to see if they are in accord with the aim of
the activity. Actions taken by the physician and the patient will have consequences on
the realization o f the good o f health.
Weaknesses of Reflective Morality
Reflective morality is a far more liberal approach to ethical decision making
where elemental standards for conduct may be treated differently. Although physicians
in reflective morality abide by the basic principles for healthcare, this moral praxis
accommodates situations where these principles may be violated when the circumstances
are such that the greater aim of the activity would be achieved.
It is harder to take a liberal approach to ethics because foundations are few and far
between and there is more room for consideration than in applying conventions to a
moral deliberation. Accepting a more liberal view of morality widens the field of valid
normative values. Such a liberal approach leads to excessive relativism of normative
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values. For example, a physician asked to perform a lethal injection o f a condemned
prisoner may have a hard time rejecting such a task under a reflective moral praxis.
Physicians as the custodians of knowledge and skill of medicine should not be required to
use it in any manner requested of them. If a physician objects to using his skill to execute
a condemned prisoner, his position should not be challenged. This leads to the general
principle that a physician may decline to participate in treating a patient. In other cases, a
physician may be asked to perform an abortion or prescribe a medication that would
inhibit conception. If the physician disagrees with using medical skill in this way, he
should have the ability to object.
These examples illustrate that physicians do have knowledge of the good of health
and how to work towards it. They offer their professional services to patients who seek
the good o f health. Excessive relativism, however, abandons grounding principles
whereby the fanciful preferences of a community or a patient may not be in accord with
the good end o f health. Consider a patient seeking a prescription for narcotic pain
medication, not because he has chronic pain or injury, but because he just wants the
euphoric effects of the drug. This is a misuse of the medication and an abuse of the
physician’s authority to write prescriptions for narcotics. Because the patient believes
that taking these drugs will have a transient benefit, the physician knows that abuse of
these drugs would have long term damaging physical effects. The prudent action for the
physician is to coach the patient on the dangers of narcotic abuse including the negative
physical effects o f long term use including dependence and bodily harm. Here the
physician must- see the long term benefit of denying the patient the narcotic prescription
without a valid medical justification.
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Reflective morality may invite ethical relativism and pluralism in excess. As the
above examples show, sometimes the desires of the patient are not in line with the
ultimate health of the patient. In these instances, a physician is better served adhering to
medical principles over accommodation o f the patient’s preferences.
A Hybrid Theory of Medical Morality
Neither a purely conventional nor a reflective morality is better than the other.
Both have attractive features and undesirable weaknesses. In lieu of this certainly a
hybrid theory with the best features of both is most instructive to resolving ethical
problems in clinical medicine.
We return to what is basic about the physician-patient relationship. A patient
seeks the advice and help o f a physician when the patient is ill. This is the clinical
encounter and the omega point for clinical ethics and the entire healthcare system. The
physician holds the key to the vast resources of healthcare whose purpose is to restore
health to the sick. The physician is the custodian o f the medical art and is committed to
his profession to help those in their desire to achieve the good of health. Which resources
to use are at the physician’s discretion, but his decision is not absolute; it is influenced by
patient preferences and often external factors.
What is ideal in a clinical relationship is that the relative state of health can be
achieved for the patient to restore him to his optimal ftmctioning. To that end the clinical
encounter should be grounded in some ethical principles with the ability to fully assess
the particulars o f the situation to tailor activity toward the best achievement o f the good
of health. Conventional morality is focused on applying the principles while reflective
morality could be too broadly construed to include excessive relativism and pluralism.
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Ideally, then, we would seek an ethical paradigm that grounds the encounter as
purposefiil toward a good end while also remaining open to divergent moral values
brought to the encounter.
The clinical encounter is always the result of an internal morality between the
physician and the patient. As we have explored in this work there are instances where
external moral factors have influenced either the patient or the physician, or both.
Regardless of these influences, however, the decision ultimately lies with the doctor and
the patient. So then, the doctor and the patient have the option of choosing whether or not
to accept the external influences on the clinical encounter.
The hybrid model for medical morality applied to the father-daughter kidney case
discussed earlier in this work would allow for additional options beyond the justified
conclusion from the conventional-deontological approach. The hybrid approach limits
the scope o f the consequences of the physician’s moral act while maintaining allegiance
to the normative values.
The physician’s conundrum is two fold. First, he is asked to maintain the father’s
medical confidentiality. Secondly, he is asked to lie to the wife/mother about the father’s
donor status. He can rationalize his decision as consistent with his duty to
confidentiality. But this case presents a situation where he would be justified under a
reflective praxis to breach the confidentiality if and only if breaching this confidentiality
would have reasonable benefit to the patients. Such is not the case here. It is not certain
that violating the father’s confidentiality will have a good outcome. But further, the
physician should not lie to the wife. His only recourse is to not say anything about the
father’s histocompatibility to the wife. His unwillingness to disclose this information has
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the likely effect of the wife’s confronting her husband, but whatever ensues from that
encounter is between them.
The physician does not have to become part of the conspiracy to lie to the
wife/mother about his favorable donor status. The physician has the option of not
disclosing the results o f the histocompatibility test to the wife suggesting that she ask him
what his status is. The physician can breach confidentiality only with consent of the
patient. In this case the father has not consented to this disclosure and has further asked
the physician to conceal the truth from his wife. The physician is not authorized to
release medical information on the father in this case. Additionally, he is not required to
say anything one way or the other about the father’s histocompatibility. Saying nothing of
the father’s histocompatibility would relieve the physician o f the burden of lying and
maintain a higher standard of confidentiality than saying to the wife that the father is not
a good match, “for medical reasons.”
The physician in this case justifies his lie as a supererogatory act trying to protect
the family from further emotional trauma. But the circumstances do not justify the
physician’s lie. Whatever results from the mother and father’s discussion on this topic is
for them to decide. The detriment to this relationship will occur now or later whether or
not the wife/mother discovers through her husband that he is histocompatible yet
unwilling to donate sooner rather than later. It could be reasonably argued that
maintaining the deception in the long term could be even more detrimental. But the
dynamics o f this family and their relationship are not the primary concern of the
physician. Whatever complicates this relationship is well beyond the scope of this
clinical encounter and not the responsibility of the physician to mollify.
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Deontological and conventional morality denies considering the consequences of
any moral act. Reflective morality invites numerous considerations of the consequences
for any moral act. In this case reflective morality takes consequentialism beyond what is
necessary for the physician to practice well in this case. The physician in this case
interprets his duty to maintain confidentiality as paramount but extends his act to
deception of the wife/mother through rationalizing mitigating undue harm to the family.
It is not the physician’s responsibility in this case to maintain the family; his
responsibility is to treat this child without unduly harming others. Whether or not the
family falls apart because o f the father’s decision is not relevant to the doctor’s job here.
Reconsidering this case using the hybrid model elucidates how deontologicalconventional morality limits the physician’s options. Further, reconsideration under a
reflective praxis introduces a moral obligation of the physician to consider numerous
external values or consequences of his action beyond what is reasonable to apply to a
physician in the clinical encounter. What the hybrid approach does is limit the scope of
the physician’s moral consideration of his actions to what is relevant to the case at hand
without holding him morally responsible for broad or far-reaching moral consequences or
accommodating excessive external values. In this case the reflective morality is better at
helping the physician and the patient sort out what external norms are relevant to his
clinical decision.
The deontological conventional approach appears to be academically sound but
also has an air o f righteousness. Presuming that the values for a profession are
unquestionable and to dutifully follow the rules hinders the ability to handle novel cases.
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Conventional morality accommodated the father from withholding his favorable
donor status from his family and denied his daughter her life because he did not want to
donate his kidney. Conventional morality properly applied to this case accommodates
both the doctor’s and the father’s decisions. Only with a reflective moral praxis can we
press the physician to consider breaching the father’s confidentiality if there is a
reasonable intuition that doing so would benefit the daughter. Reflective morality brings
that possibility to the table while conventional morality holds that confidentiality sacred
and despite the circumstances must be maintained.
Conventional morality provides what reflective morality underemphasizes and
that is grounding and universal principles. Through conventional morality the rules are
followed and this stabilizes the system of healthcare by articulating the role and conduct
of physicians and providing society with expectations of what physicians can and will do.
However, it does not accommodate novel or complex cases as well as reflective morality
does.
In both schemes the starting point is the principles of healthcare and physician
conduct. But only in reflective morality can the principles be violated when good cause
is present to show that the ultimate good end would be more fully achieved by breaching
the rules. This presents an irony for proponents of conventional morality.
While the essentialist-intemalists opine that their more strict approach to apply
healthcare principles facilitates the attainment of the good, this scheme in practice does
not contemplate working toward the good. Applying a strict conventional moral praxis
favors adherence to the principles with the side benefit being achievement of the good of
health. Although the essentialist-intemalist asserts that the telos of medical practice is the
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good of health, conventional moral praxis considers only duty to the principles and does
not consider the consequences of deontological application of the rules. The irony comes
about when considering reflective morality that is more focused on the consequence of
the moral act itself and its accord with achieving the good end of medicine.
Medical science is a dynamic and rapidly changing subject. Modem patients are
more informed and more critical of physicians. Also, modem patients are less loyal to
their physicians and will likely change doctors in response to changes in their insurance
plans (provided that they are insured). This is not to say that physicians should pander to
transient desires o f their patients. But the moral authority for the practice of medicine
does not lie with the physicians alone. Physicians are hard pressed to stay abreast to
rapidly changing treatments in medical science. Physicians are highly trained in
diagnosis and treatment with little formal training in ethics. Most ethics training of
physicians comes about through years of practice. It seems unfair to lay the moral
responsibility for medical activity on the physician alone. The physician is part of a
system with numerous extemal pressures affecting practice.
The patient is the person who realizes the good of health with the aid and advice
of the physician. But it is ultimately the patient who is the moral agent desirous of the
good of health. The physician works with the patient to achieve that end. The physician
cannot be said to achieve the end alone. The physician’s work should be aimed a
achieving the benefit of health for others.
An ideal paradigm would include basic grounding principles to the practice of
medicine including knowledge of - and adherence to - the principles of autonomy,
beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. For the physician’s practice adhering to - and
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knowledge o f - the principles of privacy, confidentiality, fidelity, and veracity.
Accepting these basic principles predicates a starting point for both the physician and the
patient in the clinical encounter. Then the physician and the patient may begin their work
aiming toward health for the patient in terms of achieving equilibrium among each of
these principles.
We conclude with this, that the good aim o f health is best realized when the
clinical encounter is grounded in some ethical principles, but both the physician and the
patient are not excessively encumbered by extemal values unfairly influencing their
activity toward the good end o f health. Therefore, a reflective moral praxis grounded in
consideration of conventions is the most accommodating paradigm for clinical decision
making.
A good physician practices well when he can bring the best of his theoretical
knowledge to the clinical encounter and is able to think about the practical use of his
knowledge. Textbooks may not help a physician resolve whether or not a patient should
receive one treatment over another. But his patient’s preferences and other extemal
values may inform the decision. The days of “doctor knows best” are past, now the
“doctor and the patient” know best and both medicine and society must prepare for more
robust ethical dialogue conceming the telos of the healing arts.
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